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MAY, 1952.

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“Associate yourselves, O ye people,
and ye shall be broken in pieces;”

“Take counsel together, and it
shall come to nought; speak the word,
and it shall not stand;”

“LET GOD BE YOUR FEAR,
AND LET GOD BE YOUR
DREAD.” (Isaiah viii.)

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that WHOSOEVER shall CALL
on the name of the LORD shall
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THE FORTNIGHTLY

MAY, 1952

THE INFORMATION SERVICES

THE attitude of the present Government, and of their predecessors, to the British information services is similar in many ways to the attitude of the Chamberlain administration, in the years immediately before the war, towards rearmament. Extensive lip service is paid to the importance of proclaiming to the world Britain's faith in herself, in her parliamentary democracy, in her system of individual liberty based on the rule of law, and in her vital rôle among the nations. Both Labour and Conservative Governments have agreed that the stating of Britain's case, and the proclaiming of Britain's contribution to the western alternative to Communism, are necessary ingredients for victory in the cold war. Yet both Governments, instead of building up the information services, have consistently allowed them to run down. Year by year since 1946 the B.B.C.'s external services, the Foreign Office information departments, the British Council and the overseas activities of the Central Office of Information have been reduced in scale.

Twelve months ago, when the Labour Government announced their intention to reduce again the volume of the B.B.C.'s overseas broadcasts, they met with protests from almost every important newspaper in the country, in which the editorial columns of the *Daily Herald* were in unison with those of the *Daily Telegraph*. A similar phenomenon has recurred this year. Even such organs as *The Economist* and the *Financial Times*, neither of them likely to urge the Chancellor to prodigality with the public purse, have published articles pointing to the folly of the new cuts now imposed upon the external services of the B.B.C. And just as, in 1937, there was a vocal group of Conservatives attempting to stimulate the Government to more vigorous rearmament, so now there are many back benchers who are clearer sighted on this issue than their leaders. "I have seldom," said Mr. Christopher Mayhew, referring to protests by Mr. Profumo and Mr. Rodgers at cuts in the information services, "heard two speeches from the other side containing so much with which I could approve."

The current failure to develop Britain's information services is the harder to understand if we look back at the history of modern propaganda. It was the genius of Northcliffe that first demonstrated the power of propaganda as a military weapon in the closing stages of the 1914-1918 war. Yet we, who forged the weapon, were repelled by it and con-

tent to discard it and see it taken up by others—first Russians, then Italians and Germans—as an instrument against our own power and security. And when, in 1938, we began hesitatingly to reply, it was at first as if propaganda were unfit for British tongues. The attitude is reminiscent of the knights in armour who disdained gunpowder as a weapon unbecoming to the traditions of chivalry. Propaganda is the gunpowder of the twentieth century—the new factor which has revolutionized the technique of power. Yet the disdain lingers on. In the debate on April 1 it was pointed out that whereas we are spending £1,400 million on defence for the current year, we have allotted less than £10 million to all our external information services together—and this at a time of growing intensity in the cold war.

There have been indications that the disdain for information work is still felt among some of the most senior officials of the Foreign Office at home, and among British ambassadors abroad. This is understandable; in the past the actions of a foreign power, if they were to be influenced by another country at all, were influenced by the direct action of the ambassador and his staff in that country. The contact was between the diplomat, the government to which he was accredited, and a small further group of powerful persons. To-day, however, considerable influence on the actions of a democracy may be exerted (to take a single example) by the radio of a foreign power, which speaks to the electorate who in turn influence the government. The ambassador may feel that he is being bypassed by this new instrument of foreign policy and may resent its growth. That is, of course, a wrong reading of the portents; it would be wiser to feel that the information services, including broadcasting, are a new and powerful weapon in the diplomat's hands.

The decisive phase in the struggle between the Russian hegemony and the free nations has not yet been reached. When it comes it may, or may not, take the form of military action on the scale of world war. Either way, the culminating phase cannot be fought with purely military weapons. It may well be that the new Salamis, the decisive battle in the struggle between east and west, will not be fought with ships, or aeroplanes, or guns, but in men's hearts and minds. For such a battle Britain is not yet armed.

AUSTRIAN GOLD MINE

BY G. E. R. GEDYE

PROMINENT among the reasons why Austria, despite 258 abortive conferences of the deputies of the Foreign Ministers of four great powers since 1946, is still occupied and without a treaty establishing her independence, is the existence of USIA. These four letters are the initials of the Russian words meaning "Administration of Soviet Property in Austria." Ask an Austrian—an economist, a man of business, a politician, a socialist working man or woman, a peasant—what USIA is, and you will get a variety of uncomplimentary descriptions. USIA, you will be told, in the favourite and perhaps the most apt phrase, is a cancer which is slowly spreading and destroying the economic life of the country. Or, you gather that it is an outfit combining the business methods of a Long John Silver with the sincerity of a Stiggins. Some call it a conspiratorial state within the legitimate State, whose citizens it assiduously subverts by economic or physical terror, bribery, sabotage and propaganda, inspired—and often carried out—by the arbitrary powers of a military occupation. USIA can, indeed, be shown to be all these things. But the quality which makes it the greatest of all obstacles to the long-overdue evacuation and genuine liberation of Austria is that USIA has so far proved itself an inexhaustible gold mine to the Soviet Union controlling it. Furthermore, that country obviously calculates that if the mine is one day exhausted the collapse of the Austrian economic system will be involved, bringing with it a good chance of replacement by Communism. It is a profitable gamble, with full insurance that financial loss will be made good by political gains.

Imagine a foreign consortium which controlled an area the size of, say, the Port of London, within which Britain had no power to levy duty on goods brought into it from abroad, and passed out through it on to the British markets; that in this area the laws of the land, including those on taxation, could not be enforced, nor could the police take any action undesired by the consortium; that some 300 British concerns of note, some of them large and important firms, were administered by this consortium, and that wages bills and other overheads would be met out of the gigantic profits secured by the disregard of all State charges, and by the sale of dutiable articles and those of which the import was restricted or forbidden, imported regardless of regulations and without payment of duties. Then this consortium, without even the shadow of legal justification

which it can claim for the control of some of the 300 firms, begins to spread a chain of retail stores, dealing in "outlaw goods"; these shops ignore trading-licence and closing-hour regulations, taxes, social insurance and other obligations to State and employees, and are thereby enabled easily to undersell all respectable traders. Picture the arrest and kidnapping of any who make a nuisance of themselves by opposing these developments, or who appear to know too much, and who are never heard of again; the methods being applied to estates seized, mostly without any proper claim, by the consortium, and distributed to tenants who after a year or so's possession, are being expelled in favour of sworn backers of the consortium (and enemies of the country). Imagine, finally, the British Premier and Minister of his Cabinet being cynically mocked by the management of this consortium when they protest about its criminal activities, leaving them no hope of these ever coming to an end, without the final defeat of the power behind.

These efforts of the imagination will not give a complete picture of the wealth that Marshal Stalin is drawing from the USIA gold mine, nor do they touch on the staggering profits taken from Austria's rich oilfields, exploited on USIA lines by a separate Russian concern, the Soviet Mineral Oil Administration. They do not include the operations of such Russian auxiliaries as "*fushnevtrans*" in the exploitation of Austria, which very profitably transport USIA's plunder, or those of the confiscated Danube Shipping Company, the seizure of which by the Russians has closed down for the past seven years the use of the Danube as one of the greatest international waterways in Europe. But the picture should give some idea of why the existence of USIA makes any hope of getting Russia to fulfil her written promise, contained in the Moscow Declaration of 1943 to restore full independence to Austria, extremely slender.

It is no good to attribute to Russia's actions alone the blame for a disastrous situation which could never have arisen but for our own folly. USIA was one of the bridal gifts so rashly bestowed by our statesmen on the glamour-shrouded Soviet Union during the short-lived east-west victory honeymoon at Potsdam. Nobody then seems to have sat down soberly to work out to what extent this loosely-worded instrument might be distorted by an unscrupulous beneficiary. On the face of it—and nobody, apparently, was capable of looking beyond the face of the bride—it was little more than elementary, and inadequate, justice to allow the Russians to appropriate any German property they might find in liberated Austria as part compensation for the savaging of their country by Hitler's barbarians. To-day one wonders how the western powers failed to stipulate that they, together with the Russians, should decide on just what was genuinely German property, and should share in its administration and final disposal for Russia's financial benefit. In America, where the Republican Party had no responsibility for the agreements of Yalta and

Potsdam they are a political issue. Not so in Britain, whose parties both consented, and where, of course, the officials of the Treasury and other Government departments which advised them are traditionally immune from criticism; probably this is partly responsible for the comparative obscurity in which Russia was able for a long time to abuse the Potsdam clauses.

Any property on which the Nazi invader had ever laid hand however briefly—and although the rightful owners were often never German, but Allied citizens, Jews, Austrian resisters or fugitives from the Nazi terror—was classified as “German” and seized by the Russians. Had the Russians acted honestly in accordance with the principles which the west believed had been established at Potsdam, Austria would hardly have suffered. There would have been the transference only of certain assets from one foreign power to another—from German State and private capital to Russian State capital. But the Potsdam clauses were cynically used as a justification for plunder—when unjustified plunder became embarrassing.

Take oil alone: the Russians hold practically all the rich oilfields of Austria, regardless of their former ownership by persons of Austrian or “western” nationality, on the grounds that the Germans had sequestered them during the war. Improvements made by the Germans are now made the fraudulent title to Russian seizure of millions of previously untapped gallons of oil. Zistersdorf, the most important oilfield, yields over 100,000 tons a month. In 1949 the Russians opened up new oilfields at Matzen, which now yield 25,000 to 30,000 tons a month. A year ago another field was first tapped in Aderklaa, yielding 12,000 tons monthly. Austria is allowed to buy from the Russians some 16,000 tons of her own petrol a month, for her own use. Recently Austria was forced to buy, at a high price, Zistersdorf oil from West Germany, where the Russians had exported it in exchange for industrial products.

From the start Russia used her economic acquisitions for political purposes. Ostensibly, her troops, like ours, remained in Austria after the flight of the Nazi invader solely to give the reborn Austrian State the necessary stability to rid itself of the last traces of the Germans, and to re-establish democratic government. But, right away, the Red Army applied all the irresistible forces at the disposal of a conquering army to putting USIA concerns above the law, in the political as in the economic field. The original Russian directors of the 300-odd important USIA concerns were Red Army staff officers. Few lasted over six months; most vanished abruptly. By the end of 1946, a political purge of USIA's 60,000-80,000 Austrian employees was in full swing. Apart from a limited number who went into oblivion because they were thought to know too much, factory workers who supported either of the two parties which constitute the present Austrian Government—the *Volkspartei*

(Catholic, Conservative), and the Social Democrats—were weeded out and replaced by Communists. Members of the handful of so-called "Socialist Progressives"—camouflaged Communists and renegade Socialists who, under one Erwin Scharf, have allied themselves with the Communists in the so-called "left block"—enjoyed special favour in USIA concerns, being the most hopeful instruments for penetrating key trade-union posts and works' councils. The drilling and arming of "works' guard-militia", similar to those formations which played a big rôle in the Prague Communist *putsch* of February 1948, was vigorously developed in the Russian zone, as part of an obvious plan to use the USIA concerns to build up Communist revolutionary cadres. Due to the solid positive achievements of the Social-Democratic leadership of the labouring masses between 1918 and 1934 and in face of the bitter abuse from "respectable" parties the workers, self-confident and loyal to their tried leaders, continue in increasingly difficult circumstances to ignore Communist blandishments. It has taken the Americans a long time to realize that had the Austrian workers not had so much positive proof of democratic Socialism's achievements, Austria would long ago have been lost. Not those charming relics of the Habsburg autocracy who so readily gained a hearing between the wars in London, Washington and Paris, but their opponents, whom they decried abroad as "*Austro-bolsheviks*" have provided a so far insurmountable barrier to the USIA conspiracy. When a *putsch* was attempted in 1950 the Communist commandos, transported in USIA lorries (like those who stormed the Greek Legation in Vienna on March 31 last), were defeated in the Russian sector by Socialist detachments when the Communist-run police supported the *putsch*.

The threat to Austria—and thus to all western Europe—involved in the political aspect of USIA was clearly recognized when a clause was put forward by the west in the draft of the abortive Austrian treaty. This provided for the buying out of USIA by Austria lock, stock and barrels—oil was not included—for \$150 million. That draft treaty, blocked by Russia, is now dead. The new draft for a "short treaty" of eight articles submitted to Moscow by the western powers last March, takes cognisance of Russia having bled Austria of at least \$200 million since the original offer, and therefore proposes the return of all sequestered property to the Austrians, without any suggestion of further payment. To this move on the diplomatic chessboard Russia has not yet replied.

The Trattnerhof, an imposing block of offices just off the Graben in the heart of Vienna, is the requisitioned headquarters of USIA. It is easily recognizable by the imposing parade outside of USIA-owned high-powered American cars with Russian registration numbers. Inside are housed the ten main departments of USIA—controlling its heavy and light industry, electrical, metallurgical, coal-mining, food-producing and chemical, agriculture, forests and so forth. Once the headquarters of

commercial undertaking, to-day sentries wearing the Soviet Star challenge everyone at the entrance to the building. Facts and figures which comparable trusts elsewhere actually spend money on publicizing, are put on a security level equalled only by the latest atom warfare developments on the safer side of the iron curtain. To get a sight through secret channels of these unnecessarily secret statistics puts quite a subsidiary burden on the western taxpayer. Many of what USIA pretends are top secrets are concentrated in its so-called "commercial bureau". As early as 1949, it was able to show Marshal Stalin a clear annual profit from seized Austrian undertakings of £150,000, and that was only a beginning. It indulges in many profitable side-lines.

Take, for instance, the notorious and inadequately publicized piratical "scrap deal" of a couple of years ago. Methodically, USIA's Trattnerhof secret service registered, and the Red Army secured, the vast quantities of war debris scrap in Vienna and eastern Austria. Operating through Austrians, some of whom after making gigantic paper profits vanished eastwards when the deal was concluded, the Russians sold 200,000 tons of plundered scrap alone to Czechoslovakia's war industries. Switzerland took 85,000 tons, paying with American cars, chocolate, cigarettes and other goods sold by USIA at enormous profits on the black market. A few thousand tons went to Britain.

The more highly-coloured "Third Man" ventures of USIA have become less profitable since American aid put some of the black marketeers out of business by increasing normal supplies. Here and there some incident reveals that they have not yet stopped. Just recently "*Jushnevtrans*" lodged a complaint with the Austrian Federal Railways—not with the police—that two cartons containing 40 kilograms of the American drug streptomycin had disappeared from a sealed railway truck between the Swiss frontier and Vienna. What USIA makes out of such illegal imports may be gauged from the fact that the two cartons were valued at between 1,000,000 and 1,500,000 Schillings—£14,000 to £21,000. Light has recently been thrown on another facet of USIA's anomalous position by the Deputy Soviet High Commissioner, General Kraskevitch, calling on the Austrian Minister of Commerce to demand that USIA be guaranteed for 1952 minimum supplies of such imported raw materials as steel, copper, aluminium and lead. USIA, of course, will dispatch most of the finished products through the curtain but, short of treating Austria including western Austria as on the wrong side of it, the American embargo on the export of strategic materials can never be thoroughly effective here. Reminding General Kraskevitch that Austria's 1952 share of these short-supply metals had yet to be fixed, the Minister promised him that USIA would get the same proportion as in 1951, providing, he added piously, that the products benefited the Austrian economy. This stipulation, owing to Russian control of the hole

in the east could never be enforced. Actually, USIA now finds it advantageous to conduct a proportion of its transactions legally, obtaining Austrian export or import licences, and passing payments through the National Bank.

Had the Soviet Union been content to abide by the legal meaning of "German property", left political subversion out of it and left the concerns taken over subject to the usual laws and regulations, Austrians would by now have accepted the situation. Far from this, a flagrant abuse has recently been added in the shape of the new USIA retail shops commonly known as "Uncle Joe's Junk Stores", which are growing at mushroom pace in Vienna and the Russian zone. Although not labelled as such, the contents of their windows at once betray the ownership. They are filled with the products of USIA factories—including spirits, liqueurs and perfumes which, as they evade excise charges, can be sold at prices far below the normal—and luxuries like American nylons, grape-fruit and bananas, imported in defiance of import restrictions and, of course, without paying duty. There is every kind of dumped product of Russian-controlled countries, from Russian caviar, Bulgarian cigarettes and Hungarian *barack* (apricot brandy), to cheap Czechoslovak motor cycles. No USIA shop has the obligatory Austrian *Gewerbeschein*—trading licence. There are at least 300 of them to-day (a year ago there were only 30) and another 100-200 which deal secretly in illegitimate USIA goods. The threat which they constitute to normal retail trade is assuming such proportions that in official western circles it is suspected that they are part of a plan for the "cold partition" of Austria.

The Socialist Party has called for a nation-wide boycott of USIA shops, and for the branding of Austrians who forward them as traitors. But in a country where costs of living are so high and wages so low as in Austria, and with the protecting hand of Russia everywhere stretched over USIA, neither proposal can have much practical result. Recently the new Minister of Commerce, Herr Böck-Greissau, complained to General Kraskevitch about USIA's immoral practices. The General told him that its shops were admirable institutions which benefited the workers and showed up the shamefully high profits made by the capitalists, and declined to make any changes. At the end of March, however, a protest to the Russian High Commissioner from the shop assistants' trade union against the established USIA practice of keeping shops open until 10 p.m.—in defiance of the Austrian 6.30 closing order—and also on Sundays, did produce a promise that in future they would close at the Austrian hour.

Chancellor Leopold Figl and Vice-Chancellor Adolf Schärf made personal protests—without result—last February to the Russian High Commissioner against another new disquieting departure of USIA—the application of pressure to force peasants into the Communist Party. A

month later Chancellor Figl urged the peasants to resist this illegal pressure and also not to be browbeaten into subscribing to the Russian propaganda newspaper. In 1945, USIA seized many big estates—on the usual “German property” plea—sometimes without even that pretence. Actually, these were estates of which the Nazis had robbed the former owners, accusing them of being enemies of the Nazi order. When increasing food supplies in 1948 made it less profitable to sell the yield on the black market, the estates were broken up and leased by USIA to Austrians. At the request of the Russians and to ensure the land being farmed, the Austrian Government made loans to the tenants to help them purchase equipment and livestock. Now USIA is arbitrarily cancelling leases of non-Communists and replacing them by Communist Party members.

No Austrian treaty would be worth the paper upon which it was written if it allowed USIA and kindred concerns to maintain Russia’s stranglehold on the country. Nothing but a conviction that the strength of the west had become irresistible would induce Russia to surrender her illicitly-held gold mine. Meantime she will hesitate to attempt the physical partition of Austria if this means the cutting-off of supplies generally, and especially of the current from western Austria’s great power stations, on which the yield of the gold mine depends.

(Mr. Gedye writes from Vienna.)

EUROPEAN ROBOTS

By K. M. SMOGORZEWSKI

MORE than twenty years ago Francis Delaisi, a French Liberal, insisted in his book *Les Deux Europes* that it was as important a condition of lasting peace and prosperity for the Continent to raise the economic level of the Europe of the draught-horse to that of a horse-powered Europe as to establish a system of collective security. Without prosperity the countries of eastern Europe, whose freedom was a guarantee of security for western Europe, could not remain free. Economically, the two Europes were complementary, eastern Europe was both making up the food deficits of western Europe and supplying it with coal and many raw materials; it was also a natural market for western European manufactures. There were, therefore, no risks in helping forward eastern European plans of reasonable industrialization, for the more prosperous the countries became, the greater would be their potentialities as importers of western European high-grade products. Delaisi pointed out that the division between the two Europes, the agrarian and industrial, was marked approximately by the Danzig-Warsaw-Vienna-Trieste line. Although this placed western Poland and the Czech part of Czechoslovakia on the more fortunate side of the borderline, since no customs frontiers could run across Poland and Czechoslovakia, all new Europe resulting from the Versailles peace settlement was situated in its agrarian half.

* * * * *

There are many political, geographical and social reasons why the standards of living of the two Europes showed a serious discrepancy. The main explanation is that the nations living between the Baltic, the Black Sea and the Adriatic missed the industrial revolution because either they had no national governments to take care of their own interests, or, if such governments existed, they were weak, of recent date and of only relative independence. Though Montenegro never lost its freedom, the few inhabitants could scarcely wrest the barest livelihood from its barren, inhospitable mountains. Independent Serbia was born in 1830, Greece in 1832, Rumania in 1859 and Bulgaria in 1878. Serbs and Bulgars had to work inordinately hard to earn the most modest living; Greeks in *diaspora* were giving financial help to their new State; only Rumanians were fortunate enough to possess rich oilfields and a fertile soil which

half a century ago enabled their country to become the third wheat exporter of the world, after the United States and Russia.

These five kingdoms represented about one-fifth of the total area of agrarian Europe, excluding Russia proper. With their exception the whole area in discussion from the end of the eighteenth century, that is, from the partitions of Poland, until the second decade of the twentieth century was under the control of Czarist Russia, the Ottoman Empire, the Habsburg Empire and Prussia. The two first-named were themselves backward and had governments incapable of providing their people with an efficient administration, a good education which had to be much more than a mere matter of literacy and an adequate transport system. It could not be expected that these two empires should care for the oppressed nationalities more than for their own peoples. Under the Habsburg monarchy the position of the subjected nationalities was politically and economically better, but still far from satisfactory. There were two "master races": the Germans and the Magyars. The former developed their industries in the Czech lands because of the presence there of coal and many basic raw materials, but they were not interested in industrializing other parts of the empire, especially the Austrian zone of Poland considered by the Austro-Hungarian general staff as an anti-Russian strategic *glacis*; the only important Galician industries, therefore, were extraction of crude oil and rock salt. In the Hungarian sector of the dual monarchy a few industries were erected, but the Magyar aristocracy contented itself with owning the greater part of arable land and exploiting the Magyar, Slovak and Rumanian peasants, attempting, moreover, to magyarize the two last-named. In the Prussian Polish provinces the population was subjected to a policy of germanization which was particularly successful in Silesia where deposits of coal, iron, zinc and lead permitted a great measure of industrialization and with it a massive immigration of German managers and technicians, the Poles being used only as miners and less skilled industrial workers.

* * * * *

Such was the position on the eve of the 1914-1918 war. After Germany's defeat, the dissolution of the irremediably doomed Habsburg monarchy and the expulsion of Russia, weakened by revolutionary upheaval, from its European non-Russian lands, a new territorial settlement took place. Finland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania became free; Poland recovered its independence; Rumania achieved complete unity; Czechoslovakia was created as a new State; the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes formed a common kingdom of Yugoslavia; Austria and Hungary became independent States. While Bulgaria lost all it had gained in the Balkan wars and looked with envy on Serbia's good fortune, Greece in 1922

ended its ten-years' wars, relinquishing for ever its neo-Byzantine dream and freeing itself from almost all troublesome national minorities.

The Versailles settlement was a great step in the right direction. Admittedly, the new frontiers were not perfect—no frontiers ever are. On the crossroads of dead empires many minorities remained. The six million Germans enclosed within the boundaries of Czechoslovakia, Poland, Hungary, Rumania, Yugoslavia and the Baltic states were the lost vanguards of a *Drang nach Osten* which had been forced to a halt. The 2.7 million Magyars who were now citizens of Czechoslovakia, Rumania and Yugoslavia were victims of an ill-advised policy of magyarization which had failed. The existence of these minorities was an unavoidable inconvenience which, however, could not be compared with the situation existing before the 1914-1918 war when whole historic nations were enclosed and partitioned by foreign States.

There was now in Europe more justice than ever before, but while the Versailles settlement freed all the nations from foreign domination, it left them to face their economic and financial problems alone. Only Czechoslovakia could solve these problems satisfactorily because it was lucky enough to have escaped war destruction and to have inherited three-quarters of all Austro-Hungarian industrial production; it was therefore the first country in the area to stabilize its currency and the only one to avoid inflation. In all other countries of eastern Europe villages were over-populated, industries undeveloped, communications insufficient, national economies in need of being re-shaped to the new frontiers and national finances in chaos. The road to recovery took a decade, involving many hardships, especially as foreign capital played only a modest rôle in the economic opening-up of the area. The total amount of long-term loans granted to Germany up to 1931 was equivalent to £465 million while Poland, for example, obtained during the same period only £34 million, mostly from the United States.

The great depression of 1929 had devastating effects on the national economy and public finance of eastern Europe. In 1930 an agrarian conference of the various States of the area was held in Warsaw on the initiative of the Polish Government but no workable programme could be devised because, while some great powers were indifferent, others were only too glad to see eastern European States in trouble.

Behind its hermetically-closed frontiers the U.S.S.R. started a policy of rapid industrialization and complete self-sufficiency. Since eastern European countries were in no need of Soviet timber, caviar or furs and had no industrial equipment to sell even for gold, its trade with them was negligible. But the economic difficulties of the Soviet Union's western neighbours were for Moscow a welcome opportunity to increase the export of Communist propaganda there.

Germany had a major interest in the disintegration of eastern Europe

and to this end the Weimar Republic increased home food production in order to create a glut of unsaleable surpluses in the neighbouring agrarian countries. It also sought to disrupt the economy of the area by attempting an Austro-German *Anschluss* in 1931, failing in this, however, by reason of the collective veto expressed by France, Italy and the Little Entente. The Third Reich changed its tactics towards eastern Europe. In September 1934 Herr Schacht introduced the so-called "new plan" which fitted the German rearmament policy and laid the foundations of a German-controlled "new order". Germany now started importing from eastern Europe huge quantities of raw materials, tobacco and such foodstuffs as could not be produced by its own agriculture, and was paying for them with planned and subsidized export. By 1939 Germany's share in the foreign trade of eastern European countries was two-thirds in the case of Bulgaria, one-half in the case of Yugoslavia and Hungary and two-fifths in the case of Rumania. Only Poland was able to resist this German attempt to detach eastern Europe from the west. Germany's share in Polish foreign trade during 1934-1938 was kept at one-fifth because between 1922 and 1938 Poland, making full use of its territorial access to the sea, increased about tenfold the proportion of its sea-borne trade to the total foreign trade; its sea-borne imports amounted to two-thirds of all its imports and in exports the proportion of sea-borne trade was four-fifths.

Obviously no great power with territorial ambitions in the area was able to play a constructive part in eastern Europe. Neither the U.S.S.R. nor Germany would tolerate there a confederation of States, a great power built by co-operation for the better protection of its members' security and the planning of their prosperity. Russians and Germans alike looked on eastern Europe as sooner or later to be entirely included in their own empires. Both were busy stirring up eastern European nations against each other and both were rearming in the conviction that their diametrically-opposed aims could be achieved only by a victorious war.

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Once again during the 1939-1945 war the Germans demonstrated how they understood the business of "rebuilding Europe". Millions of human beings were uprooted and millions massacred. Deprived of spiritual and political leaders eastern Europe was to be a cultural desert, a reserve of cheap food, cheap raw materials and cheap manpower for the *Herrenvolk*. Yet was it unavoidable that the wretched eastern European nations should merely change their slave-driver? Without doubt it was the grossest error to believe that the Soviet Union, when attacked by Germany, was simply waging a national war of survival and that the unexpected partnership forced upon Marshal Stalin by Hitler was a holy alliance of equally decent people which would outlast the

fighting and form the nucleus of the United Nations. The second war was not a simple struggle between democracy and totalitarianism, between virtue and vice. It was a pentagonal war in more senses than one, a fight between two police forces and three gangster bands.

The Soviet Union, the only real victor of the 1939-1945 war, transferred its military and political frontier from the Narva-Minsk-Odessa line to the Wismar-Eisenach-Semmering line, intending not only to keep what it already held, but also to go forward. Its eastern European spoils were secured in three moves: first, it annexed the three Baltic States, "unified" within the frontiers of the U.S.S.R. the Byelorussian and Ukrainian peoples, and swallowed a large slice of Rumania calling it the Moldavian Soviet Republic—in all (including part of Finland and of former East Prussia) 180,702 square miles with 21.8 million inhabitants; secondly, it imposed Communist régimes on Poland, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia and Albania—in all (excluding Yugoslavia which in 1948 ceased to be a Soviet satellite) 350,661 square miles with 70.8 million inhabitants; thirdly, there is eastern Germany, an area of 41,623 square miles with 17.3 million inhabitants, excluding Berlin.

Although certain striking similarities are discernible between the Nazi and the Soviet domination in eastern Europe, there are also marked differences. Admittedly the Soviet régime, like the Nazi, uprooted millions of human beings, sending them to slow death in the camps of forced labour; it deprived, too, the engulfed peoples of their leaders and created a cultural desert, but on the whole the Soviet approach is more subtle than the German. The Kremlin presents itself to the conquered as a liberator who cares for the well-being of the liberated and fulfils their dreams of industrialization, enabling them to reduce the over-population of the countryside and to increase their national income. The Kremlin encouraged only such type of industrialization as suited its own purpose—the development of heavy industry producing steel, tractors and fertilizers (guns, tanks and explosives).

Since immediately after the German surrender the Communist parties were not yet in full control in the people's democracies, no Soviet-style long-term planning was possible. First, a series of political purges of the Socialist, Peasant and Democratic parties allied with the Communist in the so-called national fronts was necessary; secondly, industry, banking and trade had to be nationalized; thirdly, the armed forces and the police must be in trusted hands. Short-term plans, therefore, were encouraged, aiming at achieving recovery and producing conditions better than pre-war, and these had the advantage of mobilizing popular enthusiasm.

Before embarking on long-term plans in the satellite countries the Kremlin needed to know if it was likely to succeed in its intent to control the whole of Germany through a national front government with Communists in key positions. If such a goal could be reached, the western

German industries would fall under Soviet direction thus reducing the necessity to build new steel furnaces, power stations, and chemical and machine plants in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Rumania and Bulgaria. Under the impact, however, of two defeats the Kremlin had quickly to make up its mind. In July 1947 the European Recovery Programme launched by the United States compelled it to forbid participation by its European satellites; in 1948 the U.S.S.R. was worsted in the blockade of Berlin which, had it been successful, would have had unhappy consequences on public opinion in western Germany. But when the blockade was defeated by an impressive air-lift the western Allies decided that a *de facto* partition of Germany into two States was a lesser evil than a Communist-controlled united Germany.

Moscow saw no alternative but to industrialize the satellite States as rapidly as possible. On January 25, 1949, the creation of the Council of Mutual Economic Aid (C.M.E.A.) was announced from Moscow with Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Rumania and the U.S.S.R. as original members; on February 22, 1949, Albania was admitted and on October 1, 1950, eastern Germany. The respective ministers of foreign trade and chairmen of State planning commissions appear to be members of its council. A network of bilateral trade agreements covered eastern Europe under the supervision of Anastazy I. Mikoyan and Maxim Z. Saburov, the chief Soviet delegates to the C.M.E.A. Long-term plans for the satellite countries were prepared: the Czechoslovak and Bulgarian five-year plans started in January 1949; the Polish six-year plan and the Hungarian five-year plan came into force in January 1950; a year later the Rumanian and eastern German five-year plans were put into operation and the Albanian five-year plan was announced on September 24, 1951.

As early as mid-1950 the aims of the respective development plans appeared in Moscow too modest; the Bulgarian, Czechoslovak, Hungarian and Polish plans were speeded up by substantial increases of capital investment and the augmented output of heavy industry. The revision of the Polish plan was enacted by the *Sejm* on July 22, 1950: the total of capital investment was increased from Z1.120,000 million to Z1.185,000 million; the total industrial output was to increase by 158 per cent. between 1949 and 1955 and not by 95 per cent. as originally planned. In Hungary the National Assembly on May 17, 1951, passed an act increasing the total capital investment from F.50,900 million to F.85,000 million; the total volume of industrial production was by 1954 to be 210 per cent. higher than in 1949 instead of 86.4 per cent. In Czechoslovakia, which between 1945 and 1947 lost one-fifth of its manpower, a considerable increase of industrial production was decided upon by the National Assembly in October 1951. By 1953 production was expected to be not 57 per cent., but 98 per cent. higher than in 1948. As in 1948 it was already 6 per cent. higher than in 1937, the production aim for 1953 was

in fact increased from 170 per cent. to 213 per cent. In Bulgaria, according to Mr. Anton Yugov, Minister of Heavy Industry, industrial output by the end of 1951 had reached the level envisaged for 1953.

In Table I are summarized the most important characteristics of the national development plans. Since the national budget in a Communist country comprises revenue and expenditures of all nationalized enterprises, the capital investment is part of budget expenditure. When translated into pounds sterling at the official exchange rates, these investments reach huge figures. Mr. Boleslaw Bierut, President of Poland, would have us believe, for example, that in 1951 his administration was able to

TABLE I.
DEVELOPMENT PLANS IN EASTERN EUROPE

Countries	Period of Plans	Total Investment*	Budget Expendi- ture* (1952)	Capital Invest- ment* (1952)	Industrial Output in 1951 1950 = 100	Industrial Production Aims (1938 = 100)†
ALBANIA	1951-55	L.21,000	9,100‡	3,607‡	147.1	1.200
BULGARIA	1949-53	L.425,000	344,800	180,944	119	293
CZECHOSLOVAKIA	1949-53	Kc.715,000	323,529	217,499	114.9	213
HUNGARY	1950-54	F.85,000	42,481	19,125	130.1	393
POLAND	1950-55	Z1.185,000	62,876	26,000	124.4	428
RUMANIA	1951-55	L.100,000	30,608	16,101	128.7	302
EASTERN GERMANY	1951-55	...	...	...	121.9	234

* All totals in millions of respective national currencies. Official exchange rates to the £: 140 Albanian leks, 810 Bulgarian leva, 140 Czechoslovak korunas, 32.87 Hungarian forints, 11.20 Polish zlotys and, from January 28, 1952, 31.36 Rumanian lei.

† For Poland the 100 basis is meant within prewar frontiers. When compared with the existing territory, the index for 1955 would be 289. For Bulgaria and Czechoslovakia 1937=100. For Eastern Germany 1936=100. ‡ 1951.

spend £2,241 million on new buildings, machinery and plant, that is two-thirds of the total budget expenditure of the United Kingdom. The simple explanation is, of course, that official exchange rates of the Soviet Union and all satellite countries are fictitious. The real purchasing value of Soviet and satellite currencies is from six to eight times lower than suggested by the official exchange rate. Nevertheless, capital investments are on an important scale. A useful comparison is made in Table II in which the budget expenditures and capital investments of the satellites are translated into roubles. The Soviet supervision of the national planning bodies seems to work adequately from the Kremlin point of view because proportionately the satellites are investing from their budget more than the Soviet Union itself. The Poles and the Czechoslovaks are spending per head more than the Soviet citizens.

From Table III it can be seen that the European satellites substantially increase the Soviet industrial potential. In 1951 for every 100 tons of coal produced by the Soviet Union the satellites contributed 56 tons; to every 100 kwh. of electric power generated in the Soviet Union they

TABLE II.

U.S.S.R. AND THE SATELLITES : 1952 BUDGET EXPENDITURES AND CAPITAL INVESTMENTS

Countries	Area (square miles)	Population (1950 est.)	Budget Expendi- ture* (million)	Capital Invest- ment* (million)	% of Budget Expendi- ture	Invest- ment per Head (Rb.)
ALBANIA	10,629	1,200,000	728†	288†	39.6	240
BULGARIA	42,796	7,160,000	4,827	2,533	52.6	352
CZECHOSLOVAKIA	49,330	12,463,000	25,880	17,400	67.3	1,392
HUNGARY	35,893	9,201,000	14,486	6,522	45.0	709
POLAND	120,359	24,977,000	62,876	26,000	41.4	1,040
RUMANIA	91,654	15,873,000	10,927	5,748	52.6	361
Totals	350,661	70,874,000	119,724	58,491		
U.S.S.R.	8,598,678	201,300,000	476,921	180,400	37.7	897

* All sums of money in roubles. Official exchange rates to the rouble, according to the State Bank of the U.S.S.R., on April 1, 1952 : 100 Albanian leks=Rb.8.00 ; 100 Bulgarian leva=Rb.1.40 ; 100 Czechoslovak korunas=Rb.8.00 ; 100 Hungarian forints=Rb.34.10 ; 100 Polish zlotys=Rb.100.00 ; 1,000 Rumanian lei=Rb.357.14.

† 1951.

added 45.4 kwh.; against every 100 tons of oil extracted in the Soviet Union they brought to the common pool 26.9 tons, and they added 30.3 tons of steel to every 100 tons produced in the Soviet Union. Speaking on February 9, 1946, Marshal Stalin directed that not only must the wounds inflicted by the Nazi invader be healed, but also the pre-war level of the Soviet national economy must be surpassed and the military and economic might of the Soviet Union still further strengthened. He assigned the task of aiming at such annual production figures as 500 million tons of coal, 60 million tons of oil and 60 million tons of steel. These aims, he said, could not be achieved before 1961 at the earliest. As in the meantime he has decided to make full use of the satellite robots, his purposes will be more than realized by 1955.

There is another reason why the European satellites had to be industrialized. It is well known that the Soviet rail transport system is one of the greatest handicaps to Soviet peacetime and wartime planning. It was imperative to build new steel works, power plants and factories in the area regarded by Soviet strategists as the rear of a potential front.

The satellite nations look on at this industrialization of their countries with mixed feelings. Naturally, they welcome the fact that it is being carried out so speedily, and that their depressed areas are disappearing. At the same time they are aware of being ruthlessly exploited, that big brother is taking not only the coal they extract and the steel they produce, but also a great proportion of their food and clothing. Official propaganda seeks to comfort them with statements that the national income of their respective countries is increasing. Statistically this is true, but

the increases are immediately reinvested, additional sums of money are squeezed out of the populations by yearly compulsory loans and fewer consumer goods than before the 1939-1945 war are purchasable for actual wages.

Nevertheless, whatever the price, an industrial revolution is taking place in eastern Europe. Where the west failed to take the initiative new dams and blast furnaces are being erected in an atmosphere which must have been that of the building of the Pyramids. Human rights do not count but economically the Communist planning bears fruit. The ambitious programmes fixed and the murderous tempo at which the slaves are driven cannot be explained by big brother's intention to help and make the eastern European nations happy. Is it fear that compels such haste, or imminent aggressive design?

TABLE III.
U.S.S.R. AND THE SATELLITES *: INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION
(Million metric tons for electricity '000 million kwh.)

		1937		1951		1955	
Coal†	Satellites	144	} 272	160	} 445	198	} 578
	U.S.S.R.	128		285		380	
Electricity	Satellites	30.1	} 65.9	45	} 144	67	} 223
	U.S.S.R.	35.8		99		156	
Crude Oil‡	Satellites	9.2	} 37.7	11.3	} 53.4	19	} 79
	U.S.S.R.	28.5		42.1		60	
Steel	Satellites	6.9	} 24.6	9.6	} 41.3	13	} 60
	U.S.S.R.	17.7		31.7		47	

* Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland, Rumania and Eastern Germany.

† Including lignite. Coefficients used for the satellites (quantities of lignite per ton of coal): Eastern Germany 4.5, Czechoslovakia 1.7, other countries 3.

‡ Including synthetic oil whose production in 1951 was estimates at 1,000,000 tons in Eastern Germany and 200,000 tons in Czechoslovakia, and natural oil extracted in the Soviet Zone of Austria (estimated at 2.5 million tons).

AFRICAN NATIONALISM: A SUMMING UP

By P. C. GORDON WALKER, M.P.

SO complex and baffling are the problems of Africa that any prospect of a sweeping, simple outcome has considerable intellectual attraction. Nothing can be ruled out in this rapidly moving continent—where history is bound not to repeat itself—not even the emergence of a single African nation. And, besides the local arguments adduced by Sir Charles Dundas,* there are others of a more general nature that can support his thesis. Societies that arrive late on the scene can certainly step over or miss out many of the steps through which more ancient contemporary societies have passed; indeed, in the technological field, they must do so if they are to survive at all. We can also pray in aid the tendency described by Toynbee for relatively very large social units to emerge on the edge of any system of societies.

But, even if we assume for the moment that Africa could step over the stage of 'parochial' nations and create at one jump a 'continental' nation, this would not be likely to produce the happy results foreseen by Sir Charles Dundas. The end-product would still be a nation; it would still be liable to be predatory. Nations are not formed in isolation or as the embodiment of an abstract idea; they need some force outside them in contrast to which they become self-conscious. Pakistan (which Professor Jack Simmons cites† as a possible example in favour of Sir Charles Dundas' idea) was not created because a few students thought it up, but because India was about to become a nation. It does not follow at all that large nations will avoid the errors of small nations or that they will bring peace to the world. Larger nations might well bring larger wars. But it seems to me improbable that we or our descendants will have to worry about this problem in connection with Africa. Though Sir Charles Dundas' idea is attractive, it seems so remote a possibility that we need not really bother our heads about its consequences.

Sir Charles bases his argument on two main assumptions that do not in fact lead to the conclusion he draws from them. The first assumption is that colour-consciousness will produce nationalism. Colour-consciousness is indeed a new and very powerful force in Africa; it will become an increasingly important political factor, and it will play its part in creating

* "African Nationalism", March 1952 issue of *THE FORTNIGHTLY*.

† "African Nationalism—Some Comments", April 1952 issue of *THE FORTNIGHTLY*.

nations. But it is not itself a cause of nationalism, in the sense that a single colour-consciousness will produce a single nation. Colour-consciousness is a form of anti-imperialism akin to the fellow feeling of all Asians or all Latin Americans. It is likely to inspire movements of liberation and independence but it is not likely to create an African consciousness that is essentially different from the consciousness (say) of Europeans. As Mr. Kenneth Bradley says,* it is easy to over-estimate the significance of the pan-African drum that is sometimes sounded by Dr. Nkrumah and others. A similar pan-Asian drum has sometimes been cautiously sounded by Pandit Nehru.

A common feeling between groups of nations (even warring and quarrelling nations) seems to be necessary for the very emergence of particular nations. Each nation is a member of a society of nations. European nations have fought many wars, but it is hard to see how particular European nations could have emerged had there been no Europe and no European consciousness. It is in this manner that pan-African emotion may help the emergence of African nations. So far from producing one single nation, it is far from certain that it will even produce friendly nations.

Sir Charles Dundas' second assumption is even more fallacious. It is that "following the normal course of mankind" Africans would in due course, if left to themselves, have progressed to the "national order of society." But nationalism is not something natural to human beings as such, regardless of time and place. It is a specific western product. So far from the natural evolution towards African nationalism having been halted by the "irruption into their midst of wholly alien forces" the very opposite is the truth.

The colonizers brought nationalism with them; they planted it in primitive Africa as it was planted in sophisticated China and India. It is a natural thing (in the words of Mr. Bradley) that artificially created colonies are being built into independent nations. These boundaries have often little relation to tribal boundaries, but they are the boundaries of areas in which the seed of nationalism has been planted. There may be some readjustment of boundaries (particularly in East and Central Africa if federation should succeed there); but it is no new thing in the world that nationalism should not coincide with 'natural' frontiers. Nationalism has shown its strength in Europe and elsewhere by obliterating and ignoring 'natural' units.

Wherever westerners have colonized peoples in Africa and Asia, it is within the boundaries they created that nationalism has arisen. Had India, like Africa, been divided amongst a number of western powers, there would be as many Indian nations to-day. As the Rev. H. H. E. Peacock implies,† nationalism is meaningless without political expression;

* "African Nationalism—Some Comments". † *Ibid.*

it is within the boundaries of colonies that it acquires the possibility of national expression.

Because Sir Charles thinks there is a natural tendency towards nationalism, he is able completely to disregard the influence of the Europeans in Africa. But if there had been no Europeans there would have been no nationalism. It is true and important to observe, as he does, that South African *Apartheid* implies a black as well as a white African nationalism; but nationalism would have come without this. There was no doctrine of *Apartheid* in India or Indonesia. We can therefore be pretty certain that the nations that arise in Africa, especially in the west where true colonies have existed, will coincide with the boundaries of colonies.

I must also disagree with Sir Charles Dundas about nationalism being more likely in East than in West Africa. In the second there are all the prerequisites for the sort of nationalism that grows up in western colonies; it is already on the way and nations that are reasonably coherent are already evolving for us to see. It is true that there are divisions and minorities in these nations; but so there are in many nations. Divisions, small size and economic backwardness may well produce a much slower evolution towards independent nationhood than many expect: but West African nationalism seems to me as certain as anything can be in the world.

On the other hand, in East and Central Africa it is far harder to see ahead. It may be that there will in time be so much inter-breeding that the problem of colour disappears. But this would certainly take so long to happen that it would hardly help to solve the problems facing Africa. In any case, if it did, if the white element disappeared, all we could then look forward to would be the sort of ineffective nationalism that has arisen in similar circumstances in parts of Latin America; the main driving force towards nationalism would have disappeared too. Another possibility is that South African rule might spread right over Central and East Africa. There might then emerge something of the sort of Bantu nationalism that Sir Charles envisages; a nationalism born of hatred and revolt. Even then it might no more produce a single nation than did the revolts in South America. Far the most hopeful way would be by a solution of the immense problems of the multi-racial society. For this the maintenance of British influence is essential; it gives the only hope of success. A hope only; not any certainty.

In East and Central Africa there are two problems side by side that Britain has often solved in separation but which have never before presented themselves in combination. There is the problem of the white settlers who demand the sort of independence now enjoyed by New Zealand; there is also the problem of the Africans who demand the sort of independence now enjoyed by Ceylon, or the Gold Coast. A satis-

factory solution cannot be achieved if we look at one only of these problems. This is the mistake of the nationalists in South Africa and of those 'liberals' who refuse to accept that there is any difference between the problem of African nationalism in East and West Africa.

Perhaps the best hope lies in very large-scale federation of the whole of the British Central and East Africa. This would give the various interests and communities some guarantee against local oppression; it would also permit some sorting out of boundaries that have been artificially imposed. It might also provide for the maximum sorting out of areas within the federation according to race and colour.

It may be that new experiments in federation will provide a solution. The purpose of federations is to give guarantees to minorities in order to persuade them to join a larger whole; in this case we are not so much concerned with States as with racial minorities. Perhaps second Chambers could be created that have the powers of the United States Senate but in which racial communities are represented.

However things may finally work out, communications will (as Professor Simmons says) play a large part. It is indeed because Europeans build roads and railways that they largely determine the units of nationalism. We must be careful where we build railways; they may largely determine whether Central and East Africa develop within British or South African influence. He who makes the railways of Southern Africa will make the nations of the future; he may determine whether these nations arise peacefully or in blood and hatred.

(The Rt. Hon. P. C. Gordon Walker, P.C., was Student and History Tutor of Christ Church, Oxford University, from 1931 to 1940. Since 1945 he has been Member of Parliament for Smethwick and in the last Labour Government was Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations.)

THE FOURTH YEAR OF ISRAEL

SOME COMMENTS

In the April 1952 issue of *THE FORTNIGHTLY* Professor Norman Bentwich concluded his article "The Fourth Year of Israel" thus: "Some immediate retrenchment of immigration and of Government expenditure on social services may be imposed by the lethal blow of facts." But the Government and the people of Israel are firm in their resolve that the Land of Israel shall be not only the home of every Jew who wants to enter it, but also the intellectual and spiritual centre of the Jewish people."

SO comprehensive and, for the most part, so factual is Professor Norman Bentwich that any short comment must necessarily be selective. It must be said at the outset that his survey gives a vivid idea of the multifarious energies—intellectual, technical, and physical—that are being applied to the construction of the State, of the manifold developments taking place in it, and likewise of the serious problems with which its Government have to cope. Of all these problems the most difficult and pressing is the economic position brought about primarily by the vast and unceasing influx of immigrants and the continued hostility of the neighbouring Arab countries.

Since the establishment of Israel four years ago its population has been doubled, and as many of the newcomers cannot immediately become self-supporting they must depend upon the State for their housing and subsistence. Even if Israel were surrounded by friends, her task in grappling with such an economic situation would be harassing enough. It is rendered much more formidable by the refusal of her Arab neighbours to trade with her, by their placing obstacles in the way of her commercial traffic, and particularly by the fact that a substantial part of her budget has to be spent upon an adequate and well-equipped force for self-defence. The signing of peace between them would immediately be followed by an alleviation of the economic crisis and a lessening of the rigours of austerity. But although Israel has repeatedly declared her desire to make peace, she has met with no response. The Arab States demand that the problem of the Arab refugees shall be dealt with first and solved according to their proposals, while Israel insists that it shall be discussed only as part of a general peace settlement.

There is a possibility of Israel receiving some relief from her financial burden as a result of the negotiations that she is conducting with the

Federal German Government for the satisfaction of her claim for 1,000 million dollars. This demand is based on the cost of the settlement in Israel of 500,000 Jewish immigrants from lands formerly controlled by the Nazis, at 3,000 dollars a head. Of the total sum of 1,500 million dollars, one-third is claimed from East Germany in respect of the losses sustained by Jews formerly living in this region; but while Dr. Adenauer is willing to discuss the question of reparations both to Israel and the rest of Jewry, the East German Government have ignored all such claims. The West German officials are offering Israel a much smaller sum than that demanded on the ground that they have also to meet claims from several other quarters, and it therefore remains to be seen to what extent German reparations will be of assistance to her. In any case the payment, whatever form it takes, will probably be spread over some years.

No comment upon "The Fourth Year of Israel" would be complete without some reference to its dynamic intellectual activity, which is remarkable for so small a land. Apart from 18 daily papers, it has weeklies, monthlies, and quarterlies galore. New books ranging from encyclopaedias and other scholarly works to fiction and poetry appear every day despite the paper shortage. And theatres, orchestras, and art exhibitions are further evidence of the determination that the rule of austerity shall not invade the cultural domain.

ISRAEL COHEN,
formerly General Secretary of the World Zionist Organization, and author of The Zionist Movement, A Short History of Zionism, Contemporary Jewry and the just published Travels in Jewry.

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The creation of the State of Israel, its success in its war of independence and its continuous progress represent a series of modern miracles. Optimism and a belief in terms of *credo quia impossibile* have served to spur to and arrive at achievement. The future of the State still depends on the continuance of the miraculous, which if the past serves as a pattern, will doubtless become actuality.

The oriental immigration was to some extent artificially encouraged. It has created a new problem, that of absorbing a class materially and culturally of an entirely different character. Can oil and water mix? Will one element predominate over the other, or will a new melting pot produce an ordered and satisfactory amalgam? The children can be taken into schools and influenced towards a new outlook and way of life in their most formative years. The young men and women by service in the armed forces and other forms of national service can be moulded into the approved pattern. But the middle-aged and elderly, no incon-

siderable number, present during their lifetime a problem which may prove insoluble.

Circumstances have at long last forced a halt to the unrestricted open-door and have thrown some light perhaps upon the motives of the Mandatory power in terms of its attitude to certain aspects of immigration. The economic situation is one of endless anxiety to the Government of Israel. Again, so long as Israel's relations with her Arab neighbours are governed by precarious armistice so long will her budget be burdened by a crushing armament expenditure and the immobilization from productive enterprise of so many of her youth. Her trade is hamstrung by the refusal of the Arab world, her nearest and natural customers, to trade with her. The whole atmosphere too is bedevilled by the apparently insoluble problem of the Arab refugee. There is also the relationship of Israel with the Jews in the world outside, which is one full of anxieties. Professor Bentwich is exact when he writes of the Jewish people facing with "faith and energy . . . immense material problems and spiritual difficulties." He is equally correct that the principle of piling up problems and letting solutions take care of themselves is being put to a severe test. This writer would only comment that the era of solution must now become an immediacy.

NEVILLE LASKI,

Queen's Counsel, Recorder of Burnley since 1935, President of the London Committee of Deputies of British Jews from 1923 to 1940, and Vice-President of the Anglo-Jewish Association.

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It seems that the most suitable definition of Israel would be "a small country, the problems of which are in inverse proportion to its size." Therefore, I could not but feel admiration for the way in which Professor Bentwich succeeded in reviewing, in six pages of THE FORTNIGHTLY, the fourth year of Israel. But as an oldtimer of the "Problem Land" I permit myself to reproach Professor Bentwich for omitting entirely from his otherwise full and accurate review, an issue which was of specific importance during the year in question. And that is the demand for reparations from Germany by the Government of Israel. A few facts will prove the importance of this issue and its implications.

The demand was first formulated by the Israel Government in their note of March 12, 1951, to the four occupying powers in Germany: the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain and France. In this note was demanded the imposition on Germany, western and eastern alike, of reparations to the amount of 1,500 million dollars, to be paid to the State of Israel. This amount represents only a part of the Jewish

property robbed by Nazi Germany, which now remains without heirs since the owners were murdered during the Hitler régime. The sum was fixed by the Israel Government as the amount needed for the absorption and rehabilitation of the half-a-million people who emigrated to Israel from the countries that had been under Nazi rule.

No answer was received from the Soviet Union. The three western powers answered separately, though on similar lines, on July 5, 1951. While expressing their understanding of the reasons behind the Israeli demands, they stressed the fact that according to existing agreements the United States, Great Britain and France were not in a position to demand additional reparations from Germany, either for themselves or for others. These formal answers did not express the final attitudes of the three countries. Under the influence of Jewish organizations in the democratic countries, helped by public opinion and the friendly intervention of Government circles in Great Britain and in other countries, some achievements were made. At the end of September 1951, Dr. Adenauer, the head of the West German Government, declared that the terrible crimes committed against the Jews under Nazi rule put Germany under the obligation to pay reparations to the Jewish people. The Bonn Parliament approved this declaration. At the end of 1951 Dr. Adenauer committed himself in writing, on behalf of his Government, to enter into negotiations with Israel on the basis of the Israel Government's letter of March 12. Following these developments, direct talks on reparations between the representatives of Israel and western Germany were opened at the Hague on March 20, 1952.

These are the plain facts, and now something about their implications. The problem of reparations from Germany and the question of direct talks with its representatives became the most controversial issue in Israel since the establishment of the State. Practically every second person in Israel is a direct victim of Naziism and it is quite understandable that every contact during this generation between Jews and Germans unavoidably reopens fresh wounds. As usual there is no lack of unscrupulous inciters from both extremes, right and left, who are interested in exploiting the genuine popular feelings for dubious political ends. The debate on reparations from Germany was, for the first time in the history of the Knesset, conducted in an atmosphere of violence. Street riots were organized in Jerusalem by *Herut*, the right wing nationalistic party. The permission to enter into direct parleys with Germany was given to the Government after a hard and embittered debate, during which party discipline was enforced to its utmost on both sides of the House. The decision was reached by 61 votes to 50. (The Knesset has 120 members.) Under such circumstances each result, positive or negative, of the reparation parleys, will have very serious consequences, primarily in internal politics of Israel, not to mention the obvious repercussions in foreign

ffairs.

In conclusion, I would like to draw attention to another aspect of this issue. Reparations from Germany to the State of Israel are a political phenomenon unprecedented in international law and diplomatic history. At the time of the Nazi régime, when the organized mass extermination of the Jews in Europe and the robbery of their property took place, the State of Israel had not yet come into being, and the slaughtered Jews were not its citizens. But the organized extermination of six million civilians and the plunder of their property, on the one side, and the large scale rescue of the half-a-million survivors by the small country of Israel, on the other, are also without precedent. This complex of problems being *ui generis*, I think that it is also of general human interest.

DOV B. SHERIRA,

editor-in-chief of the Knesset Records (the Israel equivalent of Hansard).

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Professor Bentwich's article recalled to my mind a conversation I had in 1937 with an eminent American Zionist just after the first partition of Palestine had been proposed. He was a 100 per cent. supporter of Zionist aims and had no doubts at all about the ultimate birth of Israel. But, in his view, the launching of Israel would be like the launching of a business concern, and he spoke of the dangers of over-optimistic expansion in the early stages which might lead to the very issue which Professor Bentwich mentions: "the growing difficulty in purchasing abroad the considerable proportion of food-stuffs and consumer goods which are required for the rapidly growing population."

During my Middle East tour last winter I could not visit Israel. But I got to Arab Jerusalem and there I heard much—some of it, of course, *ex parte*—about the economic conditions across the Israeli side of the Armistice Line—of Israeli Black Market activities and of lucrative smuggling from the Arab side where standards of life, though low, are higher than in Israel. And since my return to this country I have received a letter from an old Zionist friend who lives in Jerusalem. "The [Arab] boycott makes itself greatly felt," he wrote. "We are called upon to perform miracles despite ever-mounting difficulties in a world of friction, disunity and shaky economics. The economic conditions of Israel are far from satisfactory as you know. I am also sure that further hardships are in store for us."

As I read, I wondered if Professor Bentwich's account of the "Fourth Year of Israel" would give my friend a picture of the Israel where he lived. Or would he feel—with me—that it was so impersonal that, with all its valuable statistical details, it read more like a discreet chairman's

speech to a meeting of shareholders than a report from one who has just returned from Israel. I felt unhappy—and uneasy too—that the Arab boycott was not even mentioned. For the boycott had made my friend write as he did; it is the boycott that denies Israel the Arab corn and the Arab meat which its rapidly growing population lacks, and debar Israel's industrial enterprise from selling its output in the Arab markets of the Middle East which it had planned to serve. And, by inference, it is because of the boycott that many newly arrived immigrants—in particular those from India—have failed to stay the Israeli austerity course and have returned or have applied to return whence they came.

The boycott will persist so long as there is no peace between Israel and its Arab neighbours. And until then, Israel's present isolation in the Arab Middle East must prejudice its future. That is, as Professor Bentwich rightly implies, the crucial problem of Israel's foreign relations. But its solution must be sought in the Middle East and not in New York or London or anywhere else.

OWEN TWEEDY,

who has known Palestine since 1917 and was Public Information Officer in Jerusalem from 1936 to 1941. He has just returned from a visit to the Middle East.

HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES

BY LAWRENCE HARRY GIPSON

MR. BARRY TRAPNELL'S article* represents a serious attempt to summarize the significance of American higher education. In this connection he makes a number of interesting observations on the merits and defects of the work being done in the colleges and universities based upon a survey of the activities of a number of leading institutions which he visited during the past year. He is quite correct in stressing the magnitude of the problem of providing each year the opportunity for hundreds of thousands of young people to profit according to their respective capacities and inclinations by enrolment in some college or university. He is also correct in stating that, as a rule, the barriers to be surmounted before gaining admission to one of these institutions are not difficult, although he might well have pointed out that the better colleges and universities of the east require a satisfactory showing in the so-called "College Board Examinations" that are of such a nature as to eliminate all poorly prepared applicants—a test, however, that cannot easily be applied for admission to a state-supported institution. In other words, the general practice is to honour the graduation certificate from the public high school or private academy. But once in college, as has been indicated, the student must swim or sink and the chances that he or she will sink at the end of one or two years are much greater in America than in Great Britain.

Mr. Trapnell observes that most American higher education is vocational in its aim in that both the students and their parents are interested in a programme of study that will prepare the recipient to obtain a livelihood and an established position in society. This is doubtless as it should be in such a country as America where nine out of every ten young people are expected to make their own way once they have completed their formal education. In other words, it would be theoretically possible to send out into the world each year tens of thousands of American graduates who had spent four years in cultivating their minds without too much regard to what would be their lot—as was unhappily the case in Germany, Austria and Italy between the two wars—with all that this implies in the way of a potential explosive force.

But, granted that American colleges and universities have as one of

* "The University in America", THE FORTNIGHTLY, April 1952.

their main objectives the training of the student to occupy a useful place in society, it is necessary to point out that there is a very great gulf between the type of training offered, for example, by a private commercial or business college—a purely vocational type of institution—and the colleges of business administration to be found in all our better universities. In the latter the student is expected to take not only advanced courses in such fields as economics, public finance, English, and a foreign language, but also to select as options other courses in such fields as history, psychology, and the fine arts. These facts should be kept in mind when referring to Mr. Trapnell's article.

Nor is the study of philosophy and history neglected in most universities to the extent that Mr. Trapnell implies. The institution with which I have been identified for many years, Lehigh University, despite the great emphasis there upon the applied sciences, gives in rotation some 15 semester courses in philosophy and 45 in history. It may also be added that every student in the College of Engineering there is required to take a specified course in history based on a syllabus and involving group discussions, directed, incidentally, by a Cambridge graduate with a doctorate from Yale. The offerings of our university in other humanistic fields are equally broad and generous, with 31 semester courses provided in psychology, 42 in biology, and 50 in English language and literature, together with numerous courses in foreign languages, the classics, political science, international relations, sociology, the fine arts, mathematics, and astronomy, without reference to those in pure physics and chemistry.

It is unnecessary to say that only a very small fraction of the pupils who enter the primary school will continue their formal training until a doctorate in the graduate school is obtained. But the fact that the way is open to almost any American child with the necessary aptitude and ambition to move ahead to the realization of youthful dreams of becoming a truly educated man or woman is a matter of supreme importance in our national life. That talent can rise to the top from the bottom with comparative ease is, indeed, perhaps the chief ingredient in the cement of national solidarity. With the passing of the frontier, the schools and colleges have now become the chief levellers. The young man who becomes a hero in his college can well be the boy who left a coal pit where his father still works as a miner. That same young man may also ultimately exert a powerful and steadying influence in public life as a recognized civil leader. Examples of this movement from the bottom to the top in the United States by way of the educational ladder are legion. One may venture to assert that to a very great extent by means of this instrumentality the American nation is much more a classless society than it was 50 years ago.

One final comment I must make upon Mr. Trapnell's article on the American university. The farther along the student moves in his college

work the more rigid become the standards applied to it. A very considerable number who enter college hopeful of attaining a degree will leave without it, burdened with no sense of disgrace. Most of those, having at length secured their baccalaureate, terminate at this point their formal education. Among those who do not, some will enter a professional school to study theology, law, or medicine; others will proceed to a graduate school. Among those admitted to the latter, the great majority must content themselves with the master's degree—a degree earned after one or two years of advanced study. In other words, the American doctorate is beyond the grasp of all but a few who have clearly demonstrated their capacity to carry to completion successfully a line of independent research. Thus the American with a doctorate has, as a rule, started his or her training—involving in all some seven, eight, or more years—from a broad base in the freshman college year, which progressively narrows as he advances. There are both advantages and disadvantages in this. As Mr. Trapnell has pointed out, one so trained is apt to be less of a specialist than the individual who receives the doctorate in a British university. At the same time this broad preliminary training gives the American scholar great adaptability and, in view of rapidity of the changes in the type of problems he or she is called upon to solve, is an asset of great value.

(Since 1946 Dr. Gipson has been Research Professor of History at Lehigh University, Pa. He came to Oxford in 1904 with the first group of American Rhodes Scholars, and during 1951-52 is occupying there the Harmsworth Chair in American History.)

THE IDEAL OF *FRATERNITÉ* (1789-1849)—I

BY DAVID THOMSON

THE idea of fraternity, as an element in modern democratic thought, first entered political history during the French Revolution.* It was not from the first linked with liberty and equality, which were more often joined with such words as 'Vertu,' 'Union' or 'Justice' rather than with '*Fraternité*'. It received no mention at all in the original Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen in 1789. The famous triad, 'Liberty, Equality, Fraternity', appeared in no national constitutional document in France until as late as 1848. Yet it came to be sufficiently widely accepted as the device of democracy in France to be officially adopted by the Third Republic after 1871, and it is now formally incorporated into the Constitution of the present Fourth Republic. Article 2 of that Constitution lays down that "The motto of the Republic is 'Liberty, Equality, Fraternity.' Its principle is government of the people, for the people and by the people." The origins of the revolutionary ideal of fraternity have remained so obscure that it has usually been dismissed as a mere pious aspiration, introduced mainly for the sake of symmetry in a slogan. This is far from true. Under both the First and Second Republics it had quite precise meaning, but it was a different meaning each time.

It was unique in the revolutionary catalogue of basic democratic principles in that it alone was entirely a product of the course of the French Revolution. A *philosophe* like Voltaire could write that "States are equal and men are brothers"; Robert Burns could sing the pious faith "that man to man the world o'er shall brothers be for a' that," and the American revolutionaries, in their Declaration of Independence in 1776, could refer to "our British brethren". Fraternity was an idea in common use among Freemasons, and there is a tradition that the idea, in its French context, was masonic in origin.† However that may be, to the men of the French Revolution it had much more specific associations than it is commonly assumed to have had, and those associations were entirely with the composition of the armed forces, in particular with the National Guard. It is the National Guard which forms the link between

* It had, of course, a very long history as an idea before 1789, going back at least to Alexander the Great cf. Ernest Barker: *Social and Political Theory* (1951), p. 108n.). We are here concerned only with its bearing on modern democratic ideas.

† Cf. the rule of the masonic *Loge des Neuf-Soeurs* that: "Tous les hommes seront des frères, quelle que soit leur opinion, quelle que soit leur patrie."

he revolutionary triad, the tricolour flag, and the *Marseillaise*, and is therefore a central element in the whole republican legend of the Revolution.

On July 13, 1789, the 400 electors of Paris, whom the 60 districts of the city had appointed to choose their deputies for the Third Estate, set up a standing committee to administer the capital. As the first task was to suppress disorder, they organized a Town Guard (*milice bourgeoise*), whose uniform was to be red and blue, the city colours. Before long this force was 48,000 strong, and was composed of citizens of good repute who volunteered to bear arms. They were joined by elements of the regular army, the French Guards, who had broken from barracks and joined the people. Some of these took part in the storming of the Bastille on the following day. The next month the National Guard was put on a permanent footing, each of the 60 districts providing one battalion of 700 men; the original voluntary basis gave way to that of municipal responsibility for equipment and pay. By a decree of August 10 its officers were bound to use their troops only under the orders of the civil or municipal authorities. It was the 'National Guard' in the sense of the guardian of the nation—if need be, even against the King and the King's government—and it was regarded as the symbol of citizenship, the free citizen body in arms for the defence of its new-won liberty and of those property rights mentioned in the Declaration of Rights of Man and of the Citizen.

In the course of 1790 it was greatly extended. In February the officers of the regular army were likewise forbidden to employ troops except under civilian orders. The former police forces were incorporated into the National Guard. In June, the *milices bourgeoises* of the provincial towns were amalgamated and incorporated into the local battalions of the National Guard. All enfranchised citizens and their sons over 18 had to register for service in it. It grew into a citizen army in the fullest sense—a people under arms—and its badge now combined the white of the crown with the red and blue of Paris to make the tricolour. It excluded all who were also excluded from the vote, so that although citizenship was now identical with the duty of armed service, citizenship was itself limited by property qualifications. The National Guard was essentially a middle-class force. But within the citizen-body it represented the principle that the best way to make a soldier behave like a brother was to make your brother a soldier—and that was what fraternity meant in 1790.

To celebrate the first anniversary of the fall of the Bastille an immense *Fête des Fédérations* was organized in the Champ-de-Mars. The patriotic leagues and the provincial battalions of the National Guard came to be known as the *fédérations*, and the *Fête* was to be an armed demonstration of the new spirit of fraternity between Paris and the

provinces, and between the civilian citizen body and the new citizen armed forces. It was a vast national rally, a sort of military tattoo combined with mutual oaths of loyalty, jollification, and a solemn mass before the altar of the fatherland, celebrated by none other than Talleyrand, as Bishop of Autun. It is uncertain whether the full slogan 'Liberty, Equality, Fraternity' appeared even now, but certainly the idea of fraternity had entered upon the scene in an unforgettable setting and a precise sense.* Two years later it was the 500 National Guardsmen of Marseilles, marching to the capital on their way to the frontiers to help in the national defence, who sang as they marched the war-song of the Army of the Rhine, which Rouget de Lisle had written, and which was henceforth known as *La Marseillaise*.

The first ascertainable date when the full slogan of *Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité* appeared is May 29, 1791. And it appeared in precisely this connection, of ensuring that the armed forces of the nation could not be used against the nation. On that date the Club of the Cordeliers, whose full title was the *Société des amis des droits de l'homme et du citoyen*, heard a speech from the former Marquis de Girardin, a friend of Rousseau, on the subject of ensuring a "*force publique uniquement et entièrement nationale*." The Club then published its "opinion" that the national forces should have one simple uniform, with a plaque to be worn over the heart bearing the words *Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité*. The expressed purpose was to ensure that "amidst a free people, the public force shall be none other than the nation armed for the sole defence of its territory and its liberty, since this is the one and only way in which this force can act only on behalf of the nation, and never against it."† The armies of the *ancien régime* had been composed normally of recruits drawn from many other countries as well as from France. And the Cordeliers Club was clearly trying to implement the twelfth article of the original Declaration of Rights, which stated: "Preservation of the rights of man and of the citizen requires the existence of public forces. These forces are therefore instituted for the advantage of all, not for the private benefit of those to whom they are entrusted." Fraternity, in this sense of a nationally organized armed force on a footing of complete harmony with the people as a whole, was regarded as the necessary complement to liberty and equality, and the necessary safeguard of the "rights of man and of the citizen." As republican sentiments gained ground, the only contemporary models for a republic were the United States, Switzerland

* The anonymous writer of the article on *Fraternité* in the *Grand Dictionnaire Universel* of Larousse claims that it appeared, especially on the flags of Dauphiné and Franche-Comté. But Aulard was unable to find evidence of this claim; see his *Études et Leçons sur la Révolution française*, 6e. série, 1910, on "*La Devise Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité*"—the only serious study of the origins of the slogan.

† Aulard, *op.cit.*, pp. 13-15. The Cordeliers Club proposed the complete integration of the army of the line into the National Guard, so putting it completely at the command of the civil authorities of the *départements*.

and Venice, and of these the United States was by far the most important. La Fayette, the commander of the National Guard, was popularly associated with the revolt of the American colonists, and the pattern of democratic armed force organized to defeat a monarchical government.

It is clear, therefore, that when the idea of fraternity first entered political history between 1789 and 1791, it meant no vague and pious sentiment of universal brotherly love. It had something of its quite modern military connotation of 'fraternizing' between soldiery and citizenry. It implied not a theory of benevolence but a theory of power; a principle already foreshadowed, though not specifically worked out, in the original Declaration of Rights. The vaguer notions of brotherly benevolence towards fellow-citizens or foreigners came later.

From this time onwards the idea of fraternity seems to have caught on more widely as an element in revolutionary thought. In the Constitution of 1791 it was still not treated as one of the 'natural rights' of man, but in that year the *Dispositions fondamentales garanties par la Constitution* provided that "national festivals shall be held to preserve the memory of the French Revolution, to maintain fraternity among citizens, and to attach them to the Constitution, the fatherland and the laws."* With the coming of the Republic in September 1792, there was much general talk of the new spirit of brotherliness expected from republican citizens. The habit grew up of ending letters, both public and private, with the formula "Fraternally yours" (*Salut et fraternité*). The word was more often on people's lips, and before the end of the year it acquired a new twist. Again, it was connected with military power.

On November 19, 1792, the Convention issued its famous 'Edict of Fraternity' to the peoples of Europe, announcing that it was ready to accord "fraternity and help" to all peoples wanting to recover their freedom.† It was hoped that fraternal revolutionary sentiments would lead to spontaneous risings in support of the advancing French armies, and that the example of France would soon be followed everywhere else in Europe. Within a month this optimism was dispelled. On December 15, 1792, the Convention was obliged to issue a second decree announcing: "We do not want to dominate or enslave any people . . . but every revolution needs a provisional power . . . Such power can belong only to the French in those countries whither the pursuit of France's enemies has drawn her armies . . ." The French generals were given orders to abolish the tithe and feudal rights everywhere they went, and to replace existing governments by elected provisional administrations which would exclude the enemies of the Republic. Rousseau had suggested that men might be forced to be free: the Convention decided that they might also

* This provision was repeated verbatim as Article 301 of the French Constitution of 1795.

† "La Convention nationale déclare au nom de la Nation française qu'elle accordera fraternité et secours à tous les peuples qui voudront recouvrer leur liberté."

be forced to be fraternal.

On April 21, 1793, Maximilien Robespierre put before the Jacobin Club his *Projet de Déclaration des droits de l'homme et du citoyen*, which the Jacobins unanimously adopted. It was one of several such drafts each rivalling the other in its revolutionary and republican enthusiasm. Even here fraternity found no place in the catalogue of 'natural rights' or duties, but Article 34 of Robespierre's draft stated that "the men of all countries are brothers, and different nations should help one another, as far as they are able, like citizens of the same State." Fraternity was now assuming a constant place in the list of republican virtues, both internal and international, and it was becoming more of a vague and pious aspiration in the process.

When the Convention considered the spate of new draft 'declarations of rights' in April 1793, it was not Robespierre's version but the Girondin version which carried the day, and it spoke only of "the principles of liberty, of equality, and of the sovereignty of the people." Of several freak proposals the oddest was that of the picturesque Anacharsis Clootz, who put forward a very simple scheme:

Art. 1. There is no sovereign other than the human race.

Art. 2. Every individual or every commune which shall acknowledge this luminous and immutable principle shall be, by right, received into our fraternal association, into the Republic of men, of brothers, of universal humanity.

Art. 3. In default of continuity or of maritime communications, we shall wait for the propagation of the truth to admit the most remote communes and areas.*

This discussion took place on April 26, 1793. It may be that the enthusiasm of Clootz bore some fruit. In June the *directoire* of the Department of Paris issued a decree requiring householders to paint on the front of their houses the words *Unité, indivisibilité de la République, Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité, ou la Mort*.† Under the Terror this habit was imitated elsewhere in France, but was never universally required. The conjunction of '*Fraternité ou la Mort*' came to have an ominous and threatening implication after experience of the Terror. Originally, it must be noted, it had no such nuance. It struck an heroic rather than a menacing note, as in Patrick Henry's 'Give me liberty, or give me death!' It meant a readiness to die rather than to forgo the benefits of liberty,

* Clootz's actual phrase was "*reçu dans notre association fraternelle, dans la République des Hommes, des Germains, des Universels*," cf. L. Duguit, H. Monnier, R. Bonnard: *Les Constitutions et les principales lois politiques de la France depuis 1789* (5th ed. 1932), p. xxix. His proposal was invoked again in 1871, during the Paris Commune, by Jules Nostag: see R. W. Postgate: *Revolution from 1789 to 1906* (1920), p. 298.

† See Aulard, *op.cit.* The *Oxford Dictionary of Quotations* wrongly ascribes this incident to the Cordeliers Club instead of to the Department of Paris.

equality and fraternity.*

Such, then, were the origins of the idea of fraternity in politics. It was a product of the masonic lodges and the revolutionary clubs. It was closely associated with the constitutional problem of how to organize the armed forces of the nation so as to safeguard the newly won rights of the citizen, and with the military relations between the new Republic and its neighbours. It then acquired the qualities of optimistic and pious aspiration, and at the same time came to be associated with the war and the reign of terror, and with most unfraternal violence. The story of Cain and Abel repeated itself as the guillotine claimed its successive victims, and after only four years of revolution, it had come to mean internally a civil war against the recalcitrant and externally a synonym for nationalism.† This double transformation in what the word stood for is the most important single feature of the early history of the idea. It gave rise to the most famous of all *mots* on the subject: Metternich's remark that having seen what was done in France in the name of fraternity, if he had a brother he would rather call him cousin. By 1815 the ideal of fraternity, along with that of equality, had become associated with the dangers of Jacobinism which it was the first task of the restored monarchs and of the congress system to suppress. It therefore became peculiarly the property of the secret societies and the underground liberal revolutionary movements which gained in appeal and in strength between Waterloo and the revolutions of 1848. In this *milieu* the idea underwent a further transformation.

Between 1789 and 1796, the idea had begun as something quite specific and had become vaguer and more discredited. Between 1815 and 1848, the contrary process took place. Beginning as a vague notion of universal benevolence, it came to acquire a more specific meaning. But it was quite a new meaning.

Fraternity resumed its meaning of vague cosmopolitan benevolence because it was caught up in the Romantic movement. Victor Hugo, Lamartine and most other Romantic poets prophesied that the next stage in human history would be a universal republic of peace. In his *Marseillaise de la Paix* Lamartine wrote:

Nations! mot pompeux pour dire : Barbarie!
L'amour s'arrête-t-il où s'arrêtent vos pas?
Déchirez ces drapeaux; une autre voix vous crie :
'L'égoïsme et la haine ont seuls une patrie
La Fraternité n'en a pas!'

Because the liberal societies were often internationalist in character or in

* In the *Manifeste des Égaux* issued by the conspirators in the Babeuf Plot of 1796 occurs the phrase: "We want true equality or death," which was doubtless an echo of the Terror, to which the Babouvists looked back with some admiration. If so, it was re-echoed later by Proudhon (*De la justice*, vol. I), who described "Equality or Death" as the "law of the revolution".

† Though to Edmund Burke, at this time, it was of course just the opposite. He attacked Fox for attempting "to substitute the principles of fraternity in the room of that salutary prejudice called our country." (*Observations on the Conduct of the Minority*, 1793.)

affiliation, a fraternity of democrats seemed to be the right answer to the reactionary internationalism of the Holy Alliance and the congress system. In the hot-house atmosphere of underground revolt the idea acquired a strong flavour of Utopianism. The slogan reappeared in the revolts of July 1830 (which put Louis Philippe on the throne), November 1831, June 1832, and April 1834. In the decade of the 1830's it was the hope of desperate men.

But in the next decade it gained new precision. As the industrial revolution spread, men began to speak of "organizing" fraternity to create a new social and economic order. In 1841 Lamennais wrote: "The true society founded on natural equality is in essence, and should be in fact, only the organization of fraternity." "What is fraternity?" asked Louis Blanc, in his *Catéchisme des socialistes*. "It is equality, consecrated made positive, sanctified and sustained by love." Socialists, he added, seek a society where "fraternity, drawing together peoples after it has drawn together individuals, will lead them to look upon war as atrocious folly and will move towards the abolition of armies." Blanc devoted the first volume of the twelve which he wrote on the *Histoire de la Révolution française* to showing that the history of Europe preceding 1789 revealed the interaction of the three "principles" of authority, individualism and fraternity. The great Revolution had, of course, inaugurated the principle of fraternity.*

By 1846 there had appeared a Society of Fraternal Democrats, which was strongly supported by the Chartists in England. The Utopian communist Etienne Cabet formed a club called *La société fraternelle centrale*, and in February 1848 his placard—one of many—proposed: "Let us demand that all Frenchmen be declared brothers." Because of the prevalence of such notions during the decade of the 'forties, the ideal of fraternity became by 1848 more closely integrated in republican thought with the ideals of liberty and equality. The men who mattered in the early days of the Second Republic of 1848—Lamartine, Blanc, Cabet and others—had made it a natural part of their political theories. And socialist thinkers, intent on "organizing" equality and fraternity within the State, had given the idea a completely new significance.

(The second part of this article by Dr. Thomson—who is Fellow and Senior Tutor of Sidney Sussex College, Cambridge, and a University Lecturer in History—will be published in the next issue of THE FORTNIGHTLY.)

* Blanc, here, defines fraternity in these words: "Le principe de fraternité est celui qui, regardant comme solidaires les membres de la grande famille, tend à organiser un jour les sociétés, oeuvre de l'homme, sur le modèle du corps humain, oeuvre de Dieu, et fonde la puissance de gouverner sur la persuasion, sur le volontaire assentiment des coeurs." (*Histoire de la Révolution française* (1847), tome 1, p. 9.)

WORLD POPULATION BY 2000 A.D.

BY HUMPHREY HUMPHREYS

THOUGH man has existed a quarter-of-a-million years, for nearly the whole of that time he has been nothing more than a food gatherer like other mammals, subsisting on what the bounty of nature provided in the shape of flesh and fruit, a bounty which varied greatly with place, time and season. In such conditions an animal so large, unable to subsist on grass or vegetable fibre must always have been rather rare. Even in the most favourable circumstances hunting and food-gathering tribes require a living room of several square miles per person and it has been estimated that the human population of England in the last Ice Age—say 50,000 years ago—numbered no more than a few hundred. Eight to ten thousand years ago in the Middle East men learned the secret of food production by agriculture and pastoralism. This led to a marked increase in the numbers any particular area could support for, with seed crops that yielded a hundred-fold, with a multitude of flocks and herds, man too multiplied as never before and spread over the alluvial plains of Southern Asia in a swarm of small village communities. But most of Europe was then covered by forest and another 3,000 years passed before small tribes pushing up the Danube and along the Mediterranean coasts introduced the new technique to what was then the Dark Continent. By that time a succession of unknown and nameless men of genius in Egypt, Iraq and the Indus valley had made in the fourth millennium B.C. the series of discoveries which started civilization. The harnessing of the wind and of animal power to the service of man, irrigation and the plough, the invention of the wheel and its applications in vehicles, in pottery and in simple machinery, mathematics and metallurgy, writing and reckoning: these made city life possible and brought about a second great and rapid increase of population. Sir Leonard Woolley, when he excavated Ur of the Chaldees, worked out its inhabitants in 3,000 B.C. at about half-a-million, which is much the same as the estimated total population of Europe at that time, shortly before agriculture was introduced there. And Ur was only one of half-a-dozen similar Sumerian cities.

As this complex of new inventions spread slowly over the Old World the population rose till it reached, in one country after another, the new and higher level thus made possible and then remained more or less stable there till modern times. There were of course local ups and downs due

to war, pestilence and famine, changes of climate and migrations of peoples. Man made some improvements in his technique as when iron replaced bronze, but for several thousand years there were no really dramatic additions to the material arts and resources of civilization. And then in the last three centuries the discoveries we associate with the Renaissance and the Industrial Revolution have brought about a third and yet greater upward surge in human numbers.

World population has been increasing for most of the present century at the rate of a little more than one per cent. a year, and in spite of two world wars the rate of increase is rising. How long can it continue? Clearly only for a relatively short time, for we cannot enlarge the size of our planet and there is no real evidence that the others are habitable. There are about 1,300 million acres of the earth's surface capable of cultivation, and with our present techniques the average space required to produce food for one person is one-and-a-half acres, rather less for cereal foods, but more for a high protein diet since animals demand more room than crops. That gives us a maximum world population of 8,600 million, four times to-day's total and at the present rate of growth this will be reached in a century and a half—sooner if the rate continues to rise. This calculation rests on two assumptions which we shall examine presently—first that there will be no revolutionary improvements in food production, second that the many restrictions on the movements of people from overcrowded to under-populated countries will be abolished.

The most obvious factor tending to encourage a further growth is the advance of medical science which has been mainly responsible for the great increases of the past century. A hundred years ago the expectation of life in England was 40 years, now it is 67. At the beginning of this century our infant mortality was 140 per thousand live births, now it is under 24, and recent discoveries have produced even more dramatic results. In the 1914-1918 war the average death rate in advanced military hospitals was ten per cent. During the reconquest of Burma in the winter of 1944-1945, I commanded the forward general hospital to which all British casualties were admitted until the last phase of the advance. We received over 11,000 men, most of them transported from the battle-fields by air, and of these only 23 died. In 1946 British Guiana adopted the technique evolved in the war for controlling malaria by spraying standing water with D.D.T. In three years the birth rate has doubled and the infant mortality rate been reduced by four-fifths. It is probable that the country will soon be faced with a choice between famine or reducing its food exports, chiefly sugar for Great Britain.

We can feel confident that advances in agricultural science will not only increase the yield of food but will open new areas to cultivation. Millions of acres in northern Canada have been brought under the plough by breeding strains of wheat which will ripen rapidly enough for harvest

in the shorter summer. If men could learn to control the rainfall, millions of square miles of land now desert and of useless tropical forest where an excess of rain leaches the soil could be made to feed him. At present we can to some extent precipitate rain from the skies if the moisture is already there, but cannot stop it coming down where we do not want it. Nothing so far suggests that by the end of the century we shall be doing the latter. The dry north-east trade winds which have created the Old World's great belt of sub-tropical desert would have to change a course conditioned by the earth's rotation to become moisture laden, but some minor encroachment on the desert may be possible since North Africa was more fertile in Roman times than it is to-day.

More promising perhaps is the possibility that by the end of the century chemists may be able to synthesize the essential ingredients of food—proteins, fats and carbohydrates and the important accessory vitamins—either from substances like coal and oil which once contained them, or from inorganic matter. The important elements concerned, carbon, hydrogen, oxygen and nitrogen, are plentiful enough. At present we can live only by preying on other forms of life, animal and vegetable, and in our choice of the latter we are much more restricted than ruminants or rodents which can exist on grass, bark and leaves—all with some exceptions indigestible by man. If we could in fact learn to manufacture the ingredients of food direct we could bypass the niggardliness of nature and multiply—for a time—faster than ever.

All improvements in agriculture are subject to the law of diminishing returns which is a somewhat stilted phrase expressing what every gardener knows—that though up to a point if you put more labour and fertilizer into the soil you will increase its yield, that point of optimum productivity having been reached, further efforts of the same sort will not produce proportionately bigger crops. The whole of western Europe has now passed into the phase of diminishing returns and can no longer feed itself from its own soil. India and Japan are very near it and suffer from the chronic threat of famine, a declining standard of living and an urge to emigrate to more empty lands.

The great growth of European population in the last hundred years was made possible by the spread of agriculture to almost empty lands in America, Australia and Africa which were willing to export their vast food surplus to Europe in exchange for its manufactured goods. That phase is over. Not only are there now few empty lands to exploit but the fertility of many has been much diminished by the wasteful exploitation of the nineteenth century. Continuous wheat cultivation has exhausted many soils, felling of forests has desiccated others, over-grazing has deteriorated grasslands, and erosion on a vast scale has produced dust-bowls in America and Asia. Nor is this the whole story; not only are the principal food producing countries themselves encountering

diminishing returns, but their own populations are growing fast so that they have less and less food to export. It has been stated that in another 50 years Argentine will consume all its own beef. Moreover the countries which have hitherto fed us now aim at industrial self-sufficiency and will need less and less of the manufactured goods by which Europe has paid for its food imports. It is difficult to resist the conclusion that unless some of the hypothetical methods of manufacturing food are introduced in the next few decades the population of Europe in general and of Great Britain in particular will need to be less in 2,000 A.D. than it is at present. Such a reduction could be achieved by birth control or by emigration and both involve consideration of the racial distribution of world population by the end of the century.

The Ice Ages and their interglacial periods provided those conditions of protracted isolation in different environments and of in-breeding in small groups which biologically tend to produce varieties of animal species. Palaeolithic man was no exception and numerous varieties or sub-species, which in the human context we call races, came into existence. Some like the Tasmanians are now extinct, other such as the Bushmen, Hottentots and Pygmies of Africa, the Australian aborigines, the Sakai of Malaya and the Dyaks of Borneo are in a fair way to become either extinct or obliterated by cross-breeding. Three great divisions, white, Mongol and Negro remain. The last two are biologically the most distinct though whites are numerically the most important. The brown races, Berbers, Egyptians, Semites, Persians and Indians cannot be sharply separated on physical grounds from the Alpine and Mediterranean divisions of the white stock and should be so classed biologically.

This white or Caucasian stock has three main divisions, Nordic, Alpine and Mediterranean. The Nordic, long-headed, light-haired, blue-eyed and large of limb, was originally an inhabitant of the great plain or park land which extends from the Baltic to the Ural mountains and beyond them to the Altai in Central Asia. He was a late-comer to the civilized world and did not step upon the stage of history till the second millennium B.C. when he imposed Aryan speech on the other peoples of Europe and over much of south-west Asia, Persia and the North-Indian plain. He brought with him the horse. But numerically he has always been the least of the three white races. In 3,000 B.C. when agriculture entered Europe, when as we have seen there were Sumerian cities with half-a-million citizens, it is doubtful whether the whole Nordic race could have mustered a hundred thousand people.

Alpine man, short-headed, stocky, with dark eyes and hair was originally and is still predominately distributed along the great mountain axis which runs east and west from the Atlantic to Central Asia—the Pyrenees, Alps and Balkans, the plateaux of Asia Minor, Armenia and Persia, the Hindu Kush, Himalayas and Altai. The Swiss, the Balkan

peoples, Turks, Armenians, Persians and Jews are predominately Alpine in their physical characters. Mediterranean man, long-headed but slender with dark eyes and hair and darker skin than the other two is still seen relatively pure in southern Italy and on the Mediterranean coasts. He has always been the most numerous of the three strains, especially if we include as we should the brown races of southern Asia to which he is so closely related, and in Egypt, Sumeria and India it was he whose inventions started civilization. But for four millennia or more these three white strains have been so thoroughly mixed together by migrations and cross-breeding that nowhere will you find a pure stock. In a random sample of Swedes only seven per cent. had fair hair though 37 per cent. had blue eyes. Even to-day the traveller will meet blue-eyed Pathans on the Indian frontier, blue-eyed Kurds in Persia, blue-eyed Riff tribesmen in Morocco, relics of past migrations.

The Mongols are the most compact of the three principal races of man. A century ago they were in the main confined to the Chinese and Japanese Empires but since then they have spread steadily into S.E. Asia, the East Indies and the islands of the Pacific. They even began to establish themselves in parts of America till they were stopped by stricter immigration laws. Though they originally perhaps imported civilization from the west they have maintained it more consistently than the white races; it is salutary to remember that the Tang dynasty of China with its exquisite art flourished for the three centuries when Europe was at the lowest depth of its Dark Age.

The Negro races have always been strung out along the equatorial belt and now they girdle the globe though not continuously. They cross Africa, appear in the Negrito tribes of Papua and New Guinea, and traverse central America where they were brought by white men to cultivate the hotter part of the newly-discovered continent. The Negroes of North and South America have nearly all interbred with other races. At about the same time the Bantus spread into South Africa. Negroes are a smaller fraction of the human race than whites or Mongols for the urban revolution which originated in the Middle East and has been such a potent cause of population growth did not affect tropical Africa. That is why the Negro has contributed relatively little to the techniques of civilization, and this has given rise to the belief—widely held but totally unscientific—that he is mentally inferior to the other two races. The real explanation lies in his history, the enervating effects of a tropical climate in his homelands, and the social handicaps he is apt to suffer when he quits them.

The present numbers of the principal races of mankind cannot be exact as we have not everywhere a census to rely on, but Negroes number approximately 100 million excluding those in the two Americas, and there are about 550 million Mongols; the 750 million whites and 500 million

brown people who biologically cannot be separated from them therefore number together half the total population of this planet but the preponderance is relatively recent, and 500 years ago the brown peoples probably outnumbered the white.

The racial distribution of the world's population 50 years hence will be greatly influenced by the problem of race antagonisms and colour prejudice. There is no scientific evidence that the native endowments, physical, mental or moral, of the different races vary to any significant extent, and these antagonisms result from social and environmental causes which are best understood in historical perspective. It is not unnatural that a race, nation or tribe confronted with another living at a lower mental and physical level should conclude that it is congenitally inferior. The enlightened Athenians of the fifth century B.C. were unanimous in believing that the barbarians of the north and west—so called because their language was unintelligible—were incapable of understanding or adopting Greek civilization. However, in a century or two the neighbouring barbarians in the shape first of Macedon and then of Rome became masters of the Greek world. Those more remote—considered by the Greeks to be hardly human—were the ancestors of the nations of modern Europe. The Romans were more realistic; theirs was mainly a Mediterranean empire whose races were not widely dissimilar. Little more than a century after the empire began a Spaniard—Trajan—was deliberately selected as Emperor by the formality of adoption. A century later the emperor Severus was an African so that it is not perhaps surprising that a prolonged campaign in Scotland proved to be the death of him. St. Augustine was a Moor, and there was little or no colour prejudice in the Middle Ages. We are told of slight social but no racial objection to the marriage of Othello and Desdemona. But from the beginning of the seventeenth century there was a change. Spanish, Portuguese, English and Dutch spread over the globe; in America, Africa and Asia Europeans encountered races living at a much lower standard than their own, and concluded, like the Athenians, that a skin colour other than white or a strange speech betokened a native inferiority. Moreover Europeans, having firearms, were much more formidable in a fight and this fostered the illusion of superiority. In countries like the U.S.A., India and Africa where white and coloured peoples enjoy, or have enjoyed until recently, different standards of living and of education, the illusion has persisted. It is in fact the same illusion which up to the nineteenth century preserved the barriers between the social castes in England and other countries, barriers which even now have not completely vanished, though the general post-war levelling of living standards is rapidly breaking them down in this country.

Colour prejudice has no real basis in instinct. Southern Europeans, Spaniards, French and Italians have always mixed freely and interbred

with coloured peoples. But it has one irrational aspect which is felt to be, and perhaps in a certain sense is, instinctive, and that is the fear and dislike of something strange. That has always been the basis of anti-Semitism, for Jews tend to keep themselves apart and have different habits and beliefs from other Europeans: their first loyalty is not to the nation whose citizens they are, but to their own race and religion, and in ages of superstition this aloofness breeds myths like that of ritual murder. Because Britain is an island the English are more liable than other Europeans to these irrational xenophobias. Before they became better acquainted they disliked Frenchmen because they ate frogs. There is, however, one cause of racial antagonism which does not spring either from ignorance or superstition and that is the fear by races which have attained a high standard of living and wish to maintain it that other races, content with a much lower standard, will crowd them out of their occupations and the market for their goods. It is fear of this competition on unequal terms which has caused the U.S.A. and some British dominions to bar their gates against coloured immigrations and maintain them as white man's countries. This form of racial distinction is not unreasonable though it can only be maintained when there is the military might to guard the gates. Education, travel and changes in political power will mitigate and in the end perhaps remove the less rational causes of race antagonism, but this last one will remain until living standards all over the world have reached equality. One of the principal sources of Russian political power and of the attraction of Communism is that both expressly disown all kinds of racial and national discrimination, and proclaim equal standards for all mankind—standards, that is, in the plural, for the range of real incomes in Russia is far wider than it is in this country. Coloured races, therefore, tend to look on Russia as their champion.

The present relative racial numbers are unlikely to remain the same. Two outstanding features of the first half of this century have been the conquest of disease and the rapid increase in human productivity. But we can perceive contrasting reactions to these two results of human enterprise. White people have drawn their dividends in the form of a rapidly rising standard of living and to do so have deliberately kept their numbers stable by birth-control. Asiatic peoples on the other hand have utilized the advances in human knowledge to augment their numbers. The increase has been so rapid that the standard of living, far from rising, has tended to fall. In the past twenty years the population of the Indian peninsula has grown by the incredible figure of 92 million without any corresponding addition to its food supply and most of its people suffer from malnutrition. Nor can their standards rise till the worship of fertility which is inherent in the Hindu ideology is abandoned and facilities for birth control are provided. The population picture in 2000 A.D. will be coloured by the tendency of Asiatic peoples to pursue their

present path or to change and follow the white man's example. Such a change could not in the nature of things be immediate and it therefore seems probable that the twentieth century will reverse the trend of its predecessors and see an increase of coloured people relative to white men.

Contrasting plans are being applied to the problem of relations between the two groups. The first is the segregation of white and coloured into separate territorial units. The U.S.A., Canada, Australia—and New Zealand after she had successfully absorbed the Maoris—maintained themselves as white men's countries by preventing the immigration of coloured settlers. It seems probable that the rising nationalism of coloured peoples, of which we see many contemporary manifestations, will do the same by excluding white men—certainly from the privileged positions they have hitherto held and perhaps altogether. When Japan came out of the strict seclusion it had imposed on itself for two centuries and decided to adopt modern civilization it needed and employed many white technical advisers. After 50 years its own nationals were sufficiently trained and the white men departed. Even before India became independent the British who had once held all the senior posts in the administrative and technical services had, to an ever-increasing extent, been replaced by trained Indian personnel except in the Army.

In the vast Soviet empire there is a deliberate attempt to encourage the fusion of different peoples by cross-breeding. All forms of nationalism are frowned upon; there are constant forcible removals of whole communities from their homelands to other parts of the Soviet Union sometimes because they are needed there to man new industries, sometimes apparently as a punishment for too much local patriotism. Such a policy if persisted in cannot fail to break down racial barriers and produce a homogeneous population. If successful it would solve one of the most difficult problems in world politics, but would take several centuries to carry to completion. A third plan being attempted in South Africa is almost certainly doomed to failure, the system whereby a small dominant white caste maintains itself biologically, politically and socially distinct from the much larger numbers of its coloured fellow countrymen. It is an old system which has at times been successful as in the social castes of medieval and Renaissance Europe, and in India where it was imposed by the Aryan conquerors and lasted for 3,000 years. But even there it is now breaking down rapidly, thanks to the influence of Gandhi and his followers. The British attempt after the Mutiny to establish yet another white caste complete with its social apparatus of separate clubs lasted just 90 years and is now over. The caste system is so completely at variance with all modern trends of thought and social behaviour that it is unlikely to succeed permanently anywhere else.

(The author is Vice-Principal, University of Birmingham.)

THE BLOODLESS REVOLUTION—II

BY J. H. HUIZINGA

WHAT are the prospects for the continuation of the system of rule by an *élite* of the socially successful? To what extent can the "gentry" hope to perpetuate itself now that it has largely lost its economic basis of "cooked money" and now that there is little scope left for the emergence of a new generation of the socially successful made of that "raw money" which has so often reinforced its basis of power in the past? It is too early to suggest definite answers to this question. All one can do is to consider how far the conditions, which have enabled the gentry to survive the loss of political privileges in the nineteenth century, are present in the twentieth to enable it equally to survive the loss of economic privileges.

In so doing one is immediately struck by a cardinal difference between the past and the present. In the early nineteenth century the oligarchy of great landowners was confronted with the claim to a share of power put forward by the "raw money" that had been made in industry and trade. For the extension of the franchise was the result of pressure by a new class of the socially successful who, just because they represented "raw money", were only too eager to accept the leadership of the "cooked money". As Walter Bagehot put it in 1872: "In all countries new wealth is ready to worship old wealth, if old wealth will only let it." And that the old wealth in England has always been willing to do. Thus the gentry of 1832 could consent to share its monopoly of political power with the new rising class without having its position seriously undermined. For the leaders of the new elements, who in many cases had begun as attackers of the gentry, soon became part of it themselves and as such the most convinced defenders of its right to rule. No better example of such a transformation is there than Joseph Chamberlain, at the outset of his political career a fiery radical and republican who demanded "ransom from the idle rich for their privileges," and contemptuously described by Disraeli as "somebody who looks and talks like a cheesemonger and other frightful things," who at the end of his life was a trueblood conservative openly priding himself on belonging to "The Party of the Gentlemen of England."

But who in our twentieth century are the new class of the socially successful whom the established gentry must try to absorb and assimilate, if the traditional system of rule by an ever-renewed natural *élite*, adopting

the traditions and the style of its predecessors, is to be maintained? In the collectivist society of our day they are no longer first and foremost the possessors of that new wealth which has always been so eager to worship the old wealth. They are now rather all those who achieve social success in other fields than money-making; the technicians, organizers, bureaucrats, and, last not least, the leaders of the great trade unions. Now there are various obvious reasons why these elements are likely to be considerably less inclined "to worship the old wealth" by working their way into the gentry-class and reinforcing its social and political position of power. The material temptations which the old money has to offer are much smaller than in the days when the great country houses still flourished and "the aristocracy" as Hamilton Fyfe has said, "made a complete capture of Joseph Chamberlain, absorbed Asquith, dazzled Morley and for a time even seemed to cast its net over Lloyd George." Secondly, and more important, most of the new class of the socially successful cannot afford to send their sons to the gentlemen-factories even if they should have the ambition to do so. Thirdly, most important of all, a considerable part of the social *élite* which our collectivist era has produced, the trade union leaders, have been brought up in an aggressive class-consciousness which in most though not in all cases is apt to render them immune to the lure of the gentry class, the sediment of the *élites* produced by the individualist era.

Finally there is one other reason why this class, or perhaps one should say the system which it has perpetuated, seems in danger of disappearance. In the nineteenth century "rule by the quality" was accepted by all classes of the population just because it was not the rule of "raw" but of "cooked" money, that is to say, of a class which, however imperfect, tried to live up to the moral ideals of the gentleman. That as much as its wealth accounted for its prestige. No more typical testimony than the confession of Arnold Bennett's quoted by Lewis and Maude in their book on *The English Middle Classes*: "Their assured curt voices," he wrote in 1909, "their proud carriage, their clothes, the similarity of their manners, all show that they belong to a caste and that that caste has been successful in its struggle for life . . . I do not belong to this class by birth, artists very seldom do, I was born slightly beneath it. But by the help of God and strict attention to business I have gained the right of entrance into it. I admit I have imitated its deportment with certain modifications of my own; I think its deportment is in many respects worthy of imitation."

But is its conduct still exemplary to-day and, even if it were, is it still recognized as such by the socially successful of our time? It seems doubtful for, morally as well as intellectually, the gentleman-class appears to have forfeited a good deal of its former social prestige. In the Victorian era it was, at least outwardly, a model of all the puritan virtues, religious,

risty, sober, hardworking. Even its aristocratic top layer, so Bagehot expressed it, "dare not form a society of enjoyment as the French aristocracy once formed it; they live in fear of the middle class, the grocer and the merchant." And in that respect things have changed indeed; the sings of "Society" still thrill the masses, but they no longer inspire the grocer and the merchant, to say nothing of the urban working man, with much deferential respect. Of course, modern "Society" with its endless ghly publicized divorces, its ostentatious pleasure-seeking, its willingness to receive even "the rawest money" with open arms provided it gives good parties, forms only a small part of the gentry. But in so far "Society" provides the most visible manifestation of the social life that class, its moral decay, or, if one likes, the decay of its external conduct, has doubtless done something to undermine the social prestige of the gentry as a whole.

Likewise this class also seems to have lost some of its former cultural and intellectual credit. There was a time when the gentleman—think of Byron—excelled in these fields, too, or in any case—like Samuel Johnson's patron Lord Chesterfield—showed enough understanding and interest in the arts and the sciences to earn the respect of their practitioners. With the mass-production of gentlemen in the nineteenth century, however, when the public schools began to concentrate on the formation of character rather than on the development of the intellect, the gentry became an object of derision or indifference to the worlds of art and knowledge. Oscar Wilde described the typical Tory squire as a red-cheeked, white whiskered creature who, like so many of his class, was under the impression that an inordinate jocularity can atone for an entire lack of ideas." Laski characterized the modern gentleman as a person whose favourite authors were Surtees and Kipling, who preferred Gilbert and Sullivan to Beethoven and Mozart, who was quite unable to speak intelligible French or German and, having received a classical education, generally had little Latin and less Greek. It is, of course, ghly exaggerated and one-sided, but as a symptom of the decay of the gentleman's intellectual and cultural prestige not without significance. So because the gentry has not only lost so much of its money but also of its social, moral, intellectual and cultural prestige, it will probably no longer exercise the same irresistible attraction which in earlier days has enabled it to absorb and assimilate successive generations of the socially successful and thus perpetuate its rule.

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There remains the question whether the traditional ruling class might nonetheless maintain at least a part of its ascendancy by that other well-trodden technique which consists of infiltrating the leadership of its competitors for power rather than absorbing it. On the face of it the pros-

pects appear not unfavourable. For who are the leaders of the new ruling class which occupied "the best club of England" in 1945, driving the gentry out of its ancient stronghold with rejoicing? A good many of them are anything but proletarians; Bevin, Aneurin Bevan, Herbert Morrison and Emanuel Shinwell may have come from the masses, but Mr. Attlee, Sir Stafford Cripps, Hugh Dalton, Hugh Gaitskell, John Strachey, to mention but a few of the most prominent, all belong to the "classes" and most of them to the higher rather than the lower strata. Thus the situation is even now in some degree still the same as in Palmerston's day. "Sir," he said in the House around 1850, "we are here an assembly of gentlemen and we who are gentlemen on this side of the House should remember that we are dealing with gentlemen on the other." It is a statement which Mr. Churchill could echo to-day, without violating the truth. Hence Aneurin Bevan's complaint of some months ago about "the strong tendency of the Socialist Government to take its leaders out of the top drawer of society."

It is of course no new phenomenon, this conquest of a radical movement by members of the privileged class against which it is directed. In the same way the great Whig lords of 1832 guided the movement for an extension of the franchise and so, too, there were aristocratic elements who made common cause with the reformist parties of the end of the century. But there is one great difference between contemporary developments and those of the nineteenth century. When the representatives of the classes championed the reformist cause many of them did so, consciously or unconsciously, in the spirit of Bagehot's warning that "a political ambition of the lower classes, as such and for their own objects, is an evil of the first magnitude [which] could only be averted by the greatest wisdom and the greatest foresight in the higher classes." Their task was "to guide the new voters in the exercise of franchise, to guide them quietly and without saying what they are doing but still to guide them" and thus "to prevent or mitigate the rule of uneducated numbers." In short, the aristocratic reformers of those days championed the cause of the masses because they considered it to be the best way of retaining their own position of power or, rather, of preserving the entire system of rule by the social *élite*. Gladstone himself made no bones about it: "I am a firm believer in the aristocratic principle, the rule of the best," he said. "I am an out-and-out in-equalitarian."

Not so the twentieth century representatives of the gentry who champion the cause of the masses. Whereas Gladstone believed in a hierarchic society, Mr. Attlee holds that "the abolition of classes is fundamental to the socialist conception." Far from being missionaries of their class, he and his like are apostates, out to overthrow the entire system of rule by the *élite* of the socially successful bred in the age-old traditions of its forerunners. Their purpose is to replace the rule of the old school tie and

the silk hat, symbol of individual success past and present, by the rule of a row of caps, symbol of collective success, the headgear of that class that can only be called socially successful in the sense that through organization its members have become numerically strong enough to demand and obtain the highest prizes in the struggle for existence. Or should one say that they are out to replace the old *élite* by the new rather than to break with the aristocratic system as such? Is it their purpose to replace rule by the successful of the individualist era, whose success is largely measured in money and social status, by the rule of that equally small group that could be considered as the natural *élite* of a collectivist world; the technicians, the organizers, the managerial class? If that should be the case—and whether deliberately or not, we do seem to be moving in that direction—then it is perhaps conceivable that in spite of all bloodless revolutions the social structure and the system of government of this country will remain essentially unchanged, that the old *élite*, the gentry, will once again put the imprint of its hereditary style and outlook on the new one (a brigade of managerial bowler hats might be assimilated and absorbed, an army-corps of caps could not).

* * * * *

In conclusion, there is a price in cultural and moral losses that has had to be paid for the great and overdue gain in social justice achieved by the bloodless revolution. First of all, there is the only too visible loss of æsthetic values. Where for instance even in my young days still stood the gracious mansion known as Chesterfield House now towers a characterless block of flats. And Chesterfield House is, of course, but one of the few pleasures for the eye that have been sacrificed to the demands of an equalitarian time which in England, at any rate, has hardly yet developed a style of its own. The loss is particularly serious in the country where one Stately Home after another falls victim to the ruthless march of "progress". What is perhaps even more to be regretted is that together with their brick and mortar an ancient and valuable tradition threatens to disappear. An Italian traveller quoted by Taine had noted as early as the sixteenth century that "*chez les Anglais les nobles tiennent honte de demeurer dans les villes, ils habitent les campagnes, il s'adonnent aux choses des champs, vendent leur laine et bétail en ne jugent pointonteux les profits rustiques.*" And so it still remained, up to a point, in the nineteenth century, the ruling class maintaining its close ties with the land and after landed property had ceased to form its main source of revenue. While the industrial revolution defiled England's green and pleasant land with the ugliest most soulless cities the world has ever seen, the leaders of this revolution used their "raw money" to buy themselves estates in the country in imitation of the "cooked" money and thus to procure at

least for their children that environment and style of life which they needed to gain entrance into the circles of the established ruling class.

One might well suggest that this rural environment where the new elements from the new cities came in salutary contact with a lovingly cultivated nature drenched with the memories and the lessons of England's glorious past, has contributed not a little to making the gentleman what he is. Would a man like Baldwin, who has spoken so movingly of the simple joys of country life in his beloved Worcestershire, have been the same quiet, philosophical, sly and yet amiable character if he had never known any other surroundings nor style of life or interests than those of the dirty, vulgar, money-minded industrial districts where his steel factories stood? It seems difficult to believe. The traditional intimacy with the land and the simple things and people of the land can hardly have failed to have exercised a profound and, both culturally and morally, highly beneficial influence on the formation of many generations of the ruling class. And that tradition now seems in danger of being lost. In so far as the new ruling class consists of proletarians these have in great majority never known the country-life; in so far as it is still recruited from the gentry its members are finding the maintenance of the old ties with the land financially increasingly difficult.

The question finally arises to what extent economic levelling is compatible with the preservation of a high level of civilization in general. The equalitarians do not worry about this; they assume either that civilization is a product of the masses, and that hence its level will rise in proportion to the amount of money and leisure at their disposal, or they consider that no price in cultural values is too high for the achievement of social justice. It is difficult, however, to share their complacency and assurance. The more historically-minded, at any rate, are likely to agree with the writer in *The Times* who, looking back on the hundred years since the Great Exhibition of 1851, felt "that much of the graciousness, of the beauty and the content, of good living and fine craftsmanship has passed from our English life, perhaps for ever." And what is ultimately to become of creative intellectual endeavour in the world of fair shares? "If the Labour voter cannot see", *The Economist* has written, "why a Bishop should not shine his own shoes and stoke his own stove and still less why a woman-doctor should not scrub her own kitchen and fillet her own herrings, he should be made to understand that leisure, privacy and opportunity for external contacts are as essential to high intellectual activity as extra rations are to heavy manual labour." It was in much this same spirit that Taine defended the great hereditary fortunes 80 years earlier as "*des conservatoires préparées pour toutes les belles choses; sans aristocratie une civilisation n'est pas complète, il lui manque les grandes vies indépendantes, largement développées, affranchies de tout souci mesquin, capables de beauté comme un oeuvre d'art.*" Fortunately

Among the levellers there are some who are not unaware of these considerations. "We shall be faced", it is recognized in the recent Fabian pamphlet "Towards Equality", "with replacing the functions of the rich in securing social variety and patronizing the arts . . . wealth has allowed certain individuals the security to differ, to experiment and to defy current conventions. We must at all costs avoid the anxious conformity of a Middletown."

Civilization, however, is not only the product of those creative intellectual and aesthetic faculties that can hardly come to full fruition in the Middletown of Fair Shares. Civilization is also a matter of ethics, of that moral conduct which in England has always been embodied in the ideal of the gentleman. And in that sense, too, economic levelling might well entail a loss of civilization. Gentility, so it has been said, is nothing but ancient richness. But what will remain of this gentility when the richness is lost? Of course, the word gentility in this context refers rather to social status than to moral conduct; the gentleman in the ethical sense of the word is certainly not exclusively the product of richness. But wealth and the things that wealth can buy—freedom, space, security, self-confidence—have doubtless greatly helped that vast majority of the gentry who, no more than any other class are born as nature's gentlemen, to approximate this ideal.

Will they still be able to do so now that they have handed out such a large part of their wealth to the masses? And will they be able to do so in sufficient numbers to continue to serve these masses as an example? Let us ardently hope so. For just as the Statelike Homes have been called this country's "greatest contribution to the visual arts" so one might call the gentleman, with all the *défauts de ses qualités*, England's greatest contribution to both the art of governing and the art of living.

The first part of this article was published in the April issue of THE FORTNIGHTLY.)

A HISTORY LESSON

BY RICHARD CHURCH

No-one can say the age was democratic,
When Cranmer and Elizabeth contrived
To hold the people down with iron will
And bigotry. Too many martyrs burned
For life to run with ease, and freedom flourish.
Cropped ears were all the fashion: a journalist
Who wrote a tract about the Royal marriage,
Or project of a marriage never intended,
Lost his right hand, and could not write again.
Yet the poor wretch must wave the bleeding stump,
And vaunt the Queen, and cry No Popery
To show his loyalty and patriot's faith.

There's something in that discipline, perhaps,
Since it evoked such ardour. Strength for strength,
The rushing together of opposed extremes
Makes for an equilibrium as calm
As stagnant waters, or the tolerance
Of an unbelieving generation. The level
Is different, but a mountain-calm is healthier
Than that of marshes in the featureless plain.
So think, before denouncing Tudor tyrants;
Recall the second miracle of Canterbury,
Set before the altar, not of Our Lady
But of the older Muse of Poetry,
With Cranmer, whom Recusants and Puritans
Compared with Caiaphas, acting the part
Of oracle or pagan demagogue.

The grim Archbishop, out of monkish funds
And monastery buildings, planned a school
For fifty scholars, with two grammarians
To light again the candle of pure learning
Blown out by Cromwell fifty years before.
"But let the ploughman's son enter the room,"

Cried the hunter of New Heresy.
Some few citizens of Canterbury
Were quick to profit. A shoemaker's son,
Born beneath the shadow of Bell Harry
And Anselm's modest tower, sang with the others,
Gentlemen's sons, squires' boys, any
'Apt to learning' as harsh Cranmer phrased
This one provision for the singing scholars.

Oh merciless posterity, before
You judge that Prelate for his cruel deeds,
Faggot and stake and minor mutilations,
Think of the act which set a boy to sing
Free of the cordwainer's last, free of the dark
Alley, free to learn the craft that summoned
Tamberlaine and Helen, free to swim
The Hellespont with Leander, free to launch
A thousand ships and burn the topless towers
Of Ilium in a verbal holocaust
That set the torch blazing in Shakespeare's hand.

THE AMAZON AS IT COULD BE

BY JOHN BROWN

THE Amazon Institute, a subsidiary of UNESCO, was set up at the Iquitos conference of delegates from the countries concerned in 1948, and its purpose is to direct scientific studies of the river and apply the lessons of these studies. The countries represented at Iquitos were Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, France, Italy, Netherlands, Peru, U.S.A., and Venezuela, while Great Britain and Switzerland sent accredited observers.

The Convention adopted by the Institute embraces wide powers, and among the first fruits of this adventure in international co-operation was the Huallaga scientific expedition of 1950. Before this expedition the Peruvian Huallaga was a river unknown and was considered a reserve for explorers and naturalists. As a result of this mission of specialists from half a dozen countries the Huallaga hinterland is being opened up. Vast mineral resources have been located. The diseases of the inhabitants are now receiving proper attention, and in education an onslaught has been made. Moreover, it is now clear that white strangers are assured of a welcome from the Indian tribes of the lowlands, and the stories of reception committees armed with blowpipes and bows and arrows can be assessed at their true value. This is not to say that every tribe of Amazon Indians will welcome the whites—the high Marañón is still something of a question mark—but we can say that a new waterway more than 500 miles long into the interior is now available, mapped, and known to be safe.

Our own expedition of 1951 to the Amazon headwaters was a modest, privately-financed affair, but it turned out a good example of real international teamwork. Starting in Britain, we had valuable help from the American Geographical Society, and various government organizations in Peru and Brazil, while the reports of a previous French expedition proved very useful. The chief of the Amazon Institute in Peru, Dr. Eduardo de Habich, a famous explorer of the jungle, and Dr. Jorge Broggi, the director of the Peruvian Geological Institute, proved valuable friends to us.

We succeeded in pinpointing the Amazon source in the Andes, and are hopeful that our statistics of glacier size and movement, river flow and so on, may be useful when the time comes for hydro-electric power stations and the reclamation of the flood-zone lands, in the work of open-

ing up this vast area. The United Nations Food and Agricultural Organization experts who have visited Amazonia since 1945 believe that the food oil resources of the region are sufficient to meet the entire world deficit, if collection can be properly organized.

Our trip was comparatively uneventful. I had no encounters with jaguars, and did not even shoot an alligator. In fact, we shot for the pot, and spared the wild life, with the exception of a few fur-bearing animals. Some trips I have read about seem to have done nearly as much damage as a panzer division, but we were too busy working to have much time for sport, as general massacre of the fauna is called. Camping on thin strips of beach west of Nauta, we were choked by clouds of mosquitoes. The nets were useless against the swarms. Our clothes were soaked with sweat, and in the humid heat cooking a meal was like a day's work. There were alligators in the lagoons behind the main river, hardly distinguishable from rotting trunks, tortoises, porpoises, and, they said, anacondas, although I did not see any. Every tree was a little world, with its dictators, workers and parasites. To get through the tangled lianas one must have, as compulsory wear, a machete ready all the time. The pessimists carried both a revolver belt and a slung rifle.

There are Indian tribes in this part of Western Amazonia who hunt with bows and arrows, and this may give rise to the fears expressed by the occasional visitor, for their painted faces do not inspire confidence. But as my friend Sebastian Snow said, people who try to look ferocious may be mild creatures at heart—after all, who could look milder than Crippen or Dr. Petiot? And from the Indian point of view, I know from experience that there is nothing more ferocious-looking than a white man, armed to the teeth.

There are no supplies to be had unless one gets to a river town like Iquitos, where everything costs four times as much as in Lima or Rio, for it must be brought 1,200 miles across Peru, or two thousand miles upriver from Para. The natives live on fish, bananas, and mandioca flour. In these surroundings it is not surprising that the Europeans of Amazonia get spasms of irritability, cursing everything about the river and their own stupidity in being there. When I first went out I felt very "browned off"; I had thought of my digestion as cast iron, but some of the tropical foods were a trial. The drinks were horrible and the tobacco foul. I was in that awkward stage of learning Spanish where I could read it and understand it, but could not explain much to other people. It was very difficult to keep clean, and I grew depressed when I met white men who had "gone native", and had resigned themselves to a life of squalor.

It was a treat to get up into the sierras, where it was cold and healthy. The Indians here were filthy—they never wash until they are married, or conscripted into the army—but there was plenty of pure water and, once we were acclimatized, the splendid mountain scenery made up for a lot.

High up on the plateau of the central Andes, one is still peering up at peaks like Carnicero, which is 21,000 feet, and Huascarán, 22,000 feet.

It is in this area that two of the Amazon's chief source rivers rise—the Marañón and Huallaga. The Marañón flows north-east for 1,100 miles and is joined by the Ucayali near Nauta. The river, already distended by affluents from the Ecuador volcano belt, rolls along nearly a mile wide. From Iquitos the river, now called the Amazon proper, runs east two thousand miles to Para and the Atlantic. Big ships from Europe come up the Amazon as far as Manaos, and from here to Iquitos there is a regular service of river steamers. From Iquitos it is possible to go by launch another 868 miles south down the Ucayali. Dozens of rivers, each 500 or more miles long, pour into the Amazon, which in the rainy season resembles an inland sea, the banks being sometimes indistinguishable from midstream. So great is the volume of Amazonian water that 200 miles out into the Atlantic from the mouth the yellow flood can still be traced.

This vast water power should be, and one day will be, brought into the service of mankind. Where does all the water come from? The Andes, spine of the sub-continent, acts as a water-trap. It never rains on the west coast desert, two thousand miles long, and all the water that might irrigate this area is caught in the high watershed. Here the snow and ice are melted by the tropical sun, and great rivers are the result. The Amazon irrigates 40 per cent. of South America, and because of its geographical position the vegetation of the area grows at a prolific and even alarming speed. Chop a eucalyptus tree down for firewood, and it will be up again higher than ever in a few months. The jungle trails hacked out by the machete to-day are being reconquered tomorrow by the swarming creepers.

Jungle fever and malaria are rife in certain parts, but most areas are free of serious disease, and the new American tablet drugs can ward off malaria with a bi-weekly distribution. There is little yellow fever now, or beri-beri. The life of the river Indians is poor and sordid, with the exception of the few traders. There are vast areas still unexplored, and a great wealth of *castanha* nuts lying about by the million. Jungles as big as France are unvisited by the whites, who stick to the river bank, sending the Indians into the hinterland to get a few basketsful of nuts when a river launch is due. If the river flood waters were controlled by international development projects huge areas of land could be brought into cultivation, and tens of thousands of people from the congested lands of the east settled on plantations.

High in the Andes, at elevations of 14 to 18 thousand feet above sea level, we were continually coming across traces of the Inca empire wrecked by the Spanish conquerors. We collected rock samples for the Geological Survey in London, and there was ample evidence of enormous mineral resources. The trouble is the lack of transport facilities, for

machinery must be sent before on muleback or by llama train along the steep trails. It was embarrassing for us to be resting, puffed out and exhausted, on a mountain pass while a 70-year-old guide was grinning down at us from above. It takes three months before one's lungs are adjusted to the rarefied air, and the healthy feeling of sea level returns. The sierra Indians, with their barrel chests and rapid respiration, can accomplish journeys that would stagger an athlete. Some of them thought nothing of a "stroll" of 30 to 40 kilometres to get the latest news from a distant hacienda.

We visited the Solimana range in southern Peru, and found miles of peaks that have never been described in Andean literature. In the Titicaca country we saw the beauties of the great lake, and visited the Puma Rock, sacred in local tradition. Everywhere in the mountains the scenery was of a breath-taking character. Great jagged peaks pierced the clouds, and the sky colours at twilight were of indescribable magnificence. In the night there was a velvety silence, with nothing to disturb the mind but the occasional crash of glacier ice in distant lakes. Living close to nature made us realize what we had missed in noise-racked, tormented civilization.

(The author was a member of the 1951 Andes-Amazon expedition which started from England.)

CORRESPONDENCE

To the Editor, THE FORTNIGHTLY.

Sir,

I am completing a life of the painter George Stubbs (1724-1806) and a catalogue raisonné of his work. I should be grateful for information from those owning pictures and drawings by this artist who have not already assisted me.

BASIL TAYLOR.

86c, Philbeach Gardens,
London, S.W.5.

THE FORTNIGHTLY LIBRARY

AN ARCHBISHOP'S THIRD FORCE

By ROGER LLOYD

We are all immersed in one of the greatest revolutions in history, and each one of us is an actor in its drama. This is now so plainly evident that if we try to escape from the fact or refuse to adopt a definite attitude towards the revolution, we condemn ourselves to live by only the murky and uncertain light of an illusion. But there is more than one attitude that people commonly adopt. We can take refuge in nostalgic dreams of the past and sigh for the day when "things get back to normal," though of course they never will. Or we may eagerly welcome it and try hard to increase its pace, in the belief that it leads us to some kind of golden age which, when we have reached it, will be static and permanent. This is social and political futurism, and is the attitude of mind which counts the total sacrifice of the present for the future as a sign of high virtue. Of these two attitudes the first, though itself thoroughly bad, is not so bad as the second because it is not so appallingly cruel. Both, however, are most naïve.

There is a third and a more excellent way, and the Archbishop of York, both in his own person and in the book* which he now offers to us, is probably the outstanding exemplification of it. This is the way which wastes no time in moaning about the fact of revolution and permits itself no exaggerated optimism about its beneficence, but simply tries to understand it by amassing a large fund of exact knowledge about each of the fundamental processes which give it its driving power, by relating them to each other in a new synthesis, and by looking at the whole *sub specie aeternitatis*. His whole treatment of his theme is therefore really well informed, studiously unemotional, and perfectly calm. He never, never shrieks at his readers; he never even attempts to exhort them; he offers no policy. There is

a maximum of light and a minimum or even a minus quantity of heat. This in fact is a book for those who want to understand what is happening, and who realize that until they have put themselves to this necessary discipline any attempt to influence the direction of this revolution is only a little less dangerous than an attempt to halt it prematurely in mid-course.

By temperament and by training the Archbishop of York is better qualified than almost anyone else one could think of for such a task as this. No other highly placed ecclesiastic has a greater or more intimate knowledge of life in the back streets of great cities. Long years in Portsmouth followed by a spell as Bishop of Southwark, the most arduous of English sees, gave it to him. What he saw made him truly care, and he showed his care not by demagoguery but by taking all the many pains needed to get exact knowledge of the facts. Few know as much as he about nutrition and housing, and no one has done more to make his knowledge advance the causes to which it relates. In all his years at York he has been an indefatigable traveller, visiting churches overseas in most parts of the world, and spending some time in Moscow in the war. His range of reading and his retentive memory of all he has read are both prodigious. So when he writes about, say, Humanism, Communism, Democracy, or the Deified State he never utters words without knowledge. His writing, too, though never exciting is always readable, and a judicious use of personal reminiscence helps the reader along. Perhaps the highest qualification of all is his readiness to apply to the Church all the disturbing change which he tells us we must accept and try to consecrate in the world, for this book is intended to be the third of a trilogy, the

* *In an Age of Revolution*, by Cyril Garbett, Archbishop of York. Hodder and Stoughton. 20s.

first two of which were concerned with the fitness of the Church of England to be the Body of Christ and to serve the people in a deeply revolutionary epoch.

Here then is an Archbishop who calmly and realistically accepts the fact of revolution, and who is convinced that only by accepting it with understanding can the Church hope to influence its course and turn it at last into the only kind of revolution in which all alike are victorious. That in itself is a gesture of some importance. But how does he believe that the Church can do this? By applying reform to her own internal life more resolutely than she has yet done—and his earlier two books contain his ideas of how this might be done. Then by realizing how exactly Christian theology answers the deepest questions of ordinary people who at present create the wrong kind of revolution because they have had (or think they have had) only dusty answers. Finally by accepting the need of revolution but at the same time tempering its iconoclasm by the timelessness of its worship.

However great public anxiety or private sorrow, the priest will always say at the altar: "It is very meet, right, and our bounden duty that we should at all times and in all places give thanks unto Thee" and the people will always join with him in saying: "Holy, Holy, Holy, Lord God of Hosts, heaven and earth are full of thy glory."

The French have been trying to build up what they call a Third Force in politics, and though it does not work very well it is in actual existence, a method already on offer of pursuing social change peacefully and by consent. There seems to be a real need for a corresponding Third Force in the sphere of world revolution. At the back of the Archbishop's thinking there lurk hints that this may be his purpose, and that he sees our nation as aspiring, unconsciously but really, after this rôle, and the Church as giving this Third Force its soul. This is exactly the sort of book which can further such a conception.

THE PROBLEM OF POWER,
by Lord Radcliffe of Werneth. *Secker & Warburg.* 8s. 6d.

What the B.B.C. should do with the Reith Lectures is not an easy question. In the first official statements about their foundation the idea seemed to be that they should make an original contribution to knowledge; but this none of them has done. Lord Radcliffe's reflections on power, however, born in the study but also in life—he was, for instance, chairman of the commission that fixed the boundary between India and Pakistan—must have had great usefulness. Probably some hundreds of thousands heard his talks, and we can be sure that among them the regular readers of books of political theory could be numbered in hundreds. It was an educational opportunity nobly taken.

State power was his subject. He had to limit his theme, and he makes no references to economic power, or to those struggles for power between two personalities which can sometimes devastate the domestic scene. Beginning with Plato, he passes on to the Middle Ages where all earthly authority was healthily checked by the religious "conception of a universal moral law, ruling majestically over all human affairs." Locke, Rousseau, the makers of the American constitution—all of them Lord Radcliffe succeeds in relating to their own times and to the present day. There is an excellent chapter of practical illustration when the history of the foundation of British rule in India is re-told to show that absolute power need not corrupt.

This indeed is where the lectures cut valuably across the current of popular thought. "It has been part of the cant of English life for so long to speak of power as an evil thing, an intoxicating thing, a corrupting thing. I call it cant because all experience shows that the British are singularly fitted to the exercise of authority . . ." This is an interesting and sanguine view, but there are good reasons why Acton's famous dictum has been so long in fashion. In an

age of moral scepticism and economic insecurity, power must needs be viewed doubtfully by men of goodwill. When right and wrong appear indistinctly the application of power is more troublesome to a man of scruple than when he is entirely settled in his mind as to where right lies. A distrust of power springs partly from confusion in the moral sphere. Again, as Lord Radcliffe seems to hint, temptations to the misuse of power are less when the ruling class has well-lined pockets. Clive, after immensely enriching himself, demanded the highest standards from the administrators under him. The Victorians were of remarkable probity partly because they were so well-to-do. Power is more tempting and more dangerous when it is all a man may have. It is extremely natural for the present generation to sense this fact.

While Lord Radcliffe says much about restraints on State power in the past, he has less to offer for the present, though he is anxious over our concentration of power in a sovereign Parliament which is in the hands of a majority party. He relies most, one feels, on the good habit of the popular mind, on the moral inclinations of the nation. Even here he utters a happily phrased caution: "The British have formed the habit of praising their institutions, which are sometimes inept, and of ignoring the character of their race, which is often superb. In the end they will be in danger of losing their character and being left with their institutions: a result disastrous indeed."

WALTER JAMES

GOD, MAN AND STATE : Greek Concepts, by Kathleen Freeman. Macdonald. 12s. 6d.

Classical scholars are remarkably long suffering with a generation that treats them with scant respect. Rebuffed by educationists and ignored by technocrats instead of turning a contemptuous back upon the world they hasten to offer distillations of their labours in a form acceptable to men who could not distin-

guish confidently between Plato and Pluto. Dr. Freeman is foremost among these cupbearers, and she is prepared to play the modernist's game by showing that what she brings is relevant to present interests. Her latest book sketches some of the thoughts of the Greek philosophers about God, man, society, education, and law. Her summaries except in the last case are almost entirely confined to the philosophers, Plato and Aristotle bulking large, but the pre-Socratics, Epicurus and the Stoics getting a hearing too. What the poets and historians had to say about these great matters is not considered. The book is then in no sense another version of the Greek view of life—a ready gauge of this is that Pericles' funeral oration is quoted but twice, once in a footnote. The philosophers, and Plato is no exception, were in their writings well away from the world of men. Some of the things they taught were exceedingly odd, and struck the people of their time as being so, if Aristophanes' judgment is to be trusted. They have left behind theories, not reports on contemporary opinion. But it is theories that Dr. Freeman wishes to make known for, as she says, "because of a lack of knowledge of the history of thought, views are still put forward as new and workable which were exhaustively discussed and closely examined over 2,000 years ago by some of the acutest minds the world has ever produced." Her summaries are clear and for their generality exact, and she makes intelligible reconstructions of the oracular fragments of the early philosophers. She only occasionally discusses the topical relevance of the theories she outlines though she does take care to relate them to each other.

The most striking anticipations of modern theory are also the most superficial—Leucippus' atomic theory of matter or Anaximander's beliefs about the evolution of the human species. It is rather in Plato's discussion of the functions of the State, or the views of Aristotle or Epicurus about the purpose of life, or the arguments between Socrates and the Sophists about the nature of

truth that the old ground is uncovered on which modern controversialists make their stand, often without being acquainted with the earlier tenants. There are after all only a finite number of radically different views that are possible about these things, and it is not so much the merit of the Greeks that they thought of so many of them as that they discussed them with an uncommon instinct for essentials. That is what makes a study of them so much more rewarding than the study of any comparable body of writings. But they will not do everything for a twentieth century theorist. They had their Hobbes, their Hegel, their Russell, and the rest, but there have been three arrivals they did not anticipate, Jesus Christ, Marx and Freud. Greek concepts will not cover these three, yet no theory will do for to-day that does not take account of the truths or falsehoods of their teaching.

OWEN HICKEY

CHRISTIANITY PAST AND PRESENT, by Basil Willey. *Cambridge University Press.* 10s. 6d.

In this volume the King Edward VII Professor of English Literature at Cambridge addresses that not inconsiderable body of men and women whom the uncertainties and unsettlements of our time have driven to consider afresh the possible validity of Christian faith. Many such people have inherited from the last two generations their suspicions of it and they occupy that borderline position where they at one and the same time both long for it and yet suspect it. He has set out to answer the burning question as to how a man can find his way to that Christian faith and where he begins that pilgrimage.

Few can be better qualified to answer that specific question, for Professor Willey has clearly felt in himself the tensions which vex the mind of the modern man at this point, and the solution he offers is one that he has come by not without wrestling. He knows the history

of Christianity and he has an innate sense of the importance, both theological and practical, of the real issues that are involved. We have here therefore no faintéant and over-simplified solution, born of half knowledge, such as books of this type often proffer to vex, and rightly vex, the theologian. What Professor Willey has written demands attention, not only by those on the border-line of Christian faith, but also by the leaders of the churches. The former will find the book not only delightful to read because of the urbanity and grace of its style, but because it speaks, as few books have done of late, so directly to their condition, while ecclesiastical statesmen will see their task more precisely.

The Church has recovered, Professor Willey notes, a note of aggressive confidence. The claim is openly made that the Gospel is not to be judged by the world, but the world by the Gospel. That new confidence has been reinforced partly because the plain facts of mundane existence seem to bear testimony to the truth of some great, basic Christian contentions, partly because there seems to be a self-energized futility in the working out of humanistic schemes for world-betterment and partly, because largely under the influence of Kierkegaard, and further back, of Coleridge, the fact of moral religion, understood as choice in face of a given situation, has made large headway in the churches themselves.

Professor Willey does not join in the somewhat indiscriminating chorus of praise of Kierkegaard which is to-day fashionable, but he does believe that at that point Kierkegaard gave us a very deep and needful insight, and, accepting it, one logical consequence follows. The contemporary weight attached to dogmatic religion is counterbalanced by a healthy insistence that religion is primarily a matter of choice; it is a moral adventure, not a blind acceptance of theological statements of belief. It is what a man is in himself and what the world is actually in itself

that bid him "stand and deliver" and say 'yea' or 'nay' to Christian faith. That means repentance, and that in turn means the discovery of new spiritual power. I do not think that I gravely mistake Professor Willey's thesis when I say that he would rephrase Augustine's famous dictum and say "*Poenitentia facta quod vis crede*", for he believes that the inherent logic of forgiveness would safeguard the rightness of a man's thinking.

This volume has about it the freshness of a spring day. It is not to be pretended that it answers all the questions and the book itself cries aloud for two additional lectures—one dealing with the logic of forgiveness for our understanding of the nature of God, and the second setting forth the implications of forgiveness for ethics—but concerning the profundity and truth of its main contention there can be no doubt.

B. C. PLOWRIGHT

INFLATION, by Paul Einzig. *Chatto & Windus*. 12s. 6d.

ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF SOVEREIGNTY, by R. H. Hawtrey. *Longmans*. 24s.

Dr. Einzig's book reads partly like a very long article in an encyclopaedia, and partly like a tract for the times. To describe it in this way is to praise it. For the book gives us on the one hand a clear account, divided into brief chapters, examining inflation from every point of view, and agreeably free from economic fads and political bias. On the other hand, he does set his examination within the framework of to-day's, or rather, of last year's Britain—a welfare State with full employment and with taxation at the maximum possible.

As an expert of many years' standing, Dr. Einzig knows that inflation cannot be taken in isolation and treated as though it were a problem in physics or chemistry. Inflation is a phenomenon affecting money; one can put it in this abstract form if one wants to. But if a useful result is to be reached, one must go further and consider the nature of the different

groups of people who handle the money, and the relations between them. Inflation, in other words, is a matter of psychology and of power relations as much as of abstract economics. A tax cannot be regarded simply as a transfer of so-and-so much purchasing power from the private to the public sector of the national economy. It may or may not be passed on to the consumer; it may or may not result in an agitation for higher wages, or in a withdrawal of savings, or in a higher velocity in the turnover of money. (The last point might have been examined rather more fully; it played a large, perhaps the main, part in the rising trend of prices during the last three years.) And the way in which the public react will depend upon such factors as their self-discipline, their saving habits, and the distribution of power among trade unions, investors and pensioners, to name three groups only.

Possibly Dr. Einzig rather over-estimates the element of power outside the Government. No doubt a time comes when taxation loses its efficacy to repress inflation, but one is inclined to think that he rather exaggerates its tendency to become actually inflationary. Certainly in other quarters this doctrine has been unduly stressed by interested parties. It is probably from an exaggerated sense of the limits of what Government policy can do to counter inflation that Dr. Einzig suggests rather timid remedies—State lottery loans, loans having a guaranteed purchasing power, and a revived national savings drive. His strongest remedy is the temporary suspension of the social services—and this particular method flies to the other extreme. On the other hand Dr. Einzig is certainly right in suggesting that in to-day's circumstances lower expenditure is more effective, as an anti-inflationary force, than higher taxation. It is hard to think of any practicable retrenchment which will not be unpopular with somebody in the Britain of to-day, but that is no excuse for weakness on the part of the Government in power.

Professor Hawtrey's book is described as a second edition of the work first pub-

lished in 1930; in fact, it is a reprint of the first edition plus six chapters added to bring the story up to date. The size of the book is in this way nearly doubled.

The original portion is based on lectures delivered at the Lowell Institute in Boston early in 1929—a time when Locarno was still a powerful charm, if not a powerful reality, and when the great depression and Hitler were still to come. The League, in other words, had not yet been tested.

The additional section was written in gloomier circumstances, and, one cannot help feeling, in a spirit of greater realism. How can the power of sovereign States be restrained? Not by the sanctions which were the *ultima ratio* of the League: "Any attempt to coerce a great power is likely . . . to degenerate into . . . a war to enforce peace, which is a contradiction in terms." An alternative must be found. Professor Hawtrey examines the Schuman Plan with great care, and passes thence to the idea of a composing commission as a supranational authority. But he dares give no affirmative answer to the question whether power politics can ever be eradicated.

W. H. JOHNSTON

TRAINING AND PROMOTION IN NATIONALISED INDUSTRY, by The Acton Society Trust. Allen & Unwin. 10s. 6d.

The nationalization of industries in this country has been regarded by many people as a dangerous experiment but it must now be clear to all that this experiment must be made to work, and quickly, if we are to survive. Many famous and effective organizations, whether for production or to give service, have been built; their speed of growth and ultimate size have however always been under the control of the executive chiefs.

The Acton Society Trust's book gives a vivid picture of what happens when sturdy and independently proud units both large and small are suddenly and forcibly brought together under one re-

mote board, authority, council or commission. (It is interesting but confusing to find this lack of uniformity of titles at all levels.) This is probably the first time that all the main factors concerning the aspirations of the people employed by all the nationalized industries have been set down and discussed and the writers have been remarkably successful in producing a readable book of reference and comment from such a vast mass of varying and confusing material. Sections on training, promotion, and personnel organization describe the actual practice in the coal, transport, electricity and gas industries. The wide differences of habit and desire that must exist even in one "industry" are clearly seen in gas, where the Board took over 1,000 undertakings employing 140,000, and while one company alone employed 20,000 at least 30 others had staffs of less than ten. Small wonder that the problem of giving only "a considerable degree of equality in opportunity over unprecedentedly large areas" still remains unsolved in the multiplicity of training programmes described.

A study of the sections on promotion however makes the problem of training look but a matter of money and mechanics because the permissible choice of candidates for promotion is largely controlled by all the deep-rooted prohibitions bred in an age of fear and favouritism. Should promotion be on seniority alone as in railways or on proved experience and knowledge as in the pits? Should people be moved from one district to another and should 'outsiders' be given good jobs? These and many other searching questions are asked and discussed in a provocative manner. "Here, in short, is a basic problem of large-scale organisation: how can one reap the advantages of a centralized policy without irking or restricting the initiative of local management?" But since it is suggested that "the real barrier to the developments of this side of training policy lies less in the sphere of organization than in the minds of the managers" one is tempted to wonder if

it is not necessary to irk the few for the benefit of the many.

This book should be studied by members of the nationalized industries themselves for "only if men have some understanding of the wider issues involved can they take an intelligent part in the process of consultation" which alone can lead to acceptable, and hence, workable solutions to this huge task.

W. J. N. SOWELS

THE VICTORIAN TEMPER : A Study in Literary Culture, by Jerome Hamilton Buckley. *Allen & Unwin.* 30s.

The faults in Mr. Buckley's book are those of style rather than opinion. He is too fond of unacknowledged quotation, and though, in a survey like this, he must suggest generalities by careful concentration of details, his intensity sometimes makes for over-writing or heavy and even unintelligible reading. These criticisms apart, however, one may congratulate him on his scholarly and often entertaining survey.

He begins with an analysis of Victorianism, and the age has indeed been distorted by sweeping indictments. One cannot generalize about the Victorians: they were apathetic and progressive, materialist and religious, a combination of strong contradictions which can only rouse strong favour or such comments as that of the critic who called "the entire Victorian age a neurosis."

In literature the Victorians had to begin by seeking new values; for Keats, Shelley and Byron had long since died, Wordsworth and Coleridge had declined in creative power, and there remained no major exponents of the old Romantic ideals. Thus the new generation chose its standards by elimination, and the earliest Victorian trend was anti-Romanticism. Tennyson found Wordsworth "too diffuse and didactic," Carlyle dismissed Coleridge as "flabby and irresolute" and Byron was out of favour

by the 1850's; even Keats and Shelley were condemned (though again by Carlyle) as "miserable" and "infinitely too weak." But the anti-Romantic movement also found a positive expression, not so much in Dickens, as Mr. Buckley suggests, as in parodies by Thackeray and middle-class satire by Hood, who stood midway between the eighteenth-century humorists and the socially-minded mid-Victorians. There followed the Spasmodic school, eccentrics who shared, as Mr. Buckley describes it, only "a fairly coherent philosophy of incoherence"; but the work of Bailey and Buchanan is of interest merely to the specialist or to the student who would trace the Spasmodic influence upon authors of greater moment. Mr. Buckley's account of Tennyson's struggle to control his Spasmodic impulse, and his final acceptance of Victorian citizenship, is one of the most thoughtful chapters in the book. Another is "The Pattern of Conversion" in which he makes a most interesting study of symbolic baptism in Victorian literature, comparing versions of the Twenty-third Psalm, suggesting the significance of *The Water Babies* and the powerful use of water imagery in Dickens; there are water symbols in Tennyson's work from a childhood lyric to the time of "Crossing the Bar."

Another aspect of Victorianism, unrelated to the title of the book, is Victorian taste, and Mr. Buckley's account of it is entertaining light relief. A description of some exhibits at the Crystal Palace, the multiple-purpose furniture like the "couch-bed-life-preserver-water-closet" or the "grand buffet of M. Fourdinois" could hardly fail to cause a smile; it is less pleasant to read that Landseer deliberately exploited the bad taste of the public, and one recalls with surprise that the Prince Consort, who added so wisely to the royal collection, could also design a centrepiece decorated with models of a dead hare, a caged rat, and the remains of a dead one. Such achievements, as much as literary diatribes, mark the distance between Romantic and mid-Victorian, a strange

and complete divorce of beauty from truth.

JOANNA RICHARDSON

EDWARD LEAR'S JOURNALS :

A Selection, edited by Herbert Van Thal. *Arthur Barker.* 21s.

Edward Lear died over 60 years ago. Nowadays, he is chiefly remembered for his engaging nonsense and his pleasantly funny drawings. Often, the idioms of yesterday's humour fail to amuse us today; but Lear's fun is exceptional. Perhaps it has a quality of enduring appeal. Perhaps, curiously, it anticipates one of the moods of the contemporary sense of comedy. At any rate, there is no doubt that a number of present-day artists have derived their style and approach from a careful study of Lear's uniquely personal and delightful absurdities. But the charm of Lear's nonsense has beguiled attention from the fact that he was essentially a serious artist who devoted most of his life and energy to landscape-painting.

In his excellent book on Lear, Angus Davidson tells how, when staying at a Calabrian inn, Lear overheard a young Englishman describe him as "nothing but a dirty d—d landscape-painter" and how, thereafter, Lear had delightedly styled himself—"Edward Lear—Dirty Landscape-Painter." His decision to paint landscapes was made in 1835 when he was about 23. Hitherto, he had been employed in making accurate and minutely detailed drawings of animals and birds. He did this exacting work to perfection; but his eyesight had never been strong, and he had been troubled with asthmatic and bronchial complaints. Landscape-painting not only offered some relief from continued eye strain, but presented favourable opportunities of going abroad to warmer climates. In 1837, he left for Italy; thenceforward, much of his life was spent out of England. He was a prodigious traveller who found his way to remote and obscure places, endured frequent and considerable hardships and occasionally met truly

hazardous circumstances.

Throughout his journeys he kept continuous records. He drew incessantly, often in the most discouraging conditions; he wrote vivid commentaries in his journals. Herbert Van Thal has assembled passages from Lear's journals of his travels in Greece and Albania, southern Calabria, Corsica and, finally, an account of his exciting and dangerous excursion to Petra. The book contains only four reproductions of Lear's drawings which, though admirable as examples of explicit draughtsmanship, seem a little lifeless by comparison with the sparkling, descriptive vigour of the writing. Nevertheless, they serve well as illustrations and prompt a wish that more had been included.

It is a pity, perhaps, that the editor did not provide a short biographical note in order to relate the journeys to the context of Lear's life. That is not to say that the extracts are, in themselves, insufficient; for Lear had all the gifts of an ideal commentator, a skilled use of words, quick, enthusiastic observation, a ready understanding of people and their circumstances and, above all, an irrepressible sense of humour. The reader may well find himself echoing the appreciative words that Tennyson wrote to Lear after the publication of the Greek and Albanian journals:

"With such a pencil, such a pen,
You shadow forth to distant men,
I read and felt that I was there.

F. W. WENTWORTH-SHEILDS

ELIZABETH GASKELL: Her Life and Work, by A. B. Hopkins. *John Lehmann.* 21s.

Mrs. Gaskell and her family were anxious that no biography should appear after her death. She herself, having written the life of Charlotte Brontë, had run into a tempest. Not only, it was probably argued, was a parallel storm to be avoided, but the old controversies might easily start up again. The Life had appeared in 1857, and its author died

only eight years later. Nor was this work the only one to arouse an outcry. Accus-tomed as we have so long been to wel-come her as the gracious portrayer of the ladies of *Cranford*, we tend to forget that she fought for human rights and justice, shocking the proverbial country parson-age (and she a minister's wife!) when she published *Ruth*. Its theme of the fallen woman was an anticipation, by 40 years, of Hardy's *Tess* which, in its own time, still caused hearty rumbling. The family fear was to persist in frozen form until 1913 when, as Miss Hopkins regret-fully notes, the last remaining of Mrs. Gaskell's daughters prepared her con-science for death by destroying those letters and papers she had kept.

The loss seems not to have been so serious, if we may judge by Miss Hop-kins' new biography, the most fully documented and correctly focussed that has yet appeared. What mainly evades her in its detail is the early life. This leaves a certain area of conjecture, fes-tooned with those uncomfortable phrases that indicate the historian whose feet are dangling: "She must have felt"—"We may readily picture"—"It seems more than probable . . ." Miss Hopkins might, with courage, have jumped all these; for, once the young Elizabeth Stevenson is married, the material is clamorous enough, and keeps the narrator busy sort-ing and assembling. There is little of the Cranford ease in Mrs. Gaskell who, without any self-conscious challenge over woman's position, came nearer than most in her day to the nice balancing of home life with professional demands. She never neglected husband, children and household; she never let down an editor over an instalment of her serial works. When she did fall to argument with Charles Dickens—her most regular editor—her inflexible attitude on ques-tions of quality was the cause. As Miss Hopkins' composite picture makes clear, Mrs. Gaskell was herself a personality, not of the parading, egotistic sort, but determined, if need be, to the point of obstinacy; at the same time sympathetic, almost over-honest, loving and lovable.

In society she was elegant, cool and self-possessed; with every outward advantage over Charlotte the country mouse. Even as a novelist her range is wider and her contacts, but for Charlotte's time abroad, more varied. Her books had a readier market, and the years and health she sacrificed to her friend's biography seemed hardly worth the pains. Time was to show.

From this all-round study, perceptive yet impartial enough, Mrs. Gaskell emerges with a broader reputation. A newly-printed correspondence with her publisher George Clark shows the extent of her interest and curiosity, and the warmth of her prejudice. It was, for example, a shock to her to find that her admired George Eliot was that Marian Evans whose union to the hated Lewes she deplored. This attitude throws a light on Mrs. Gaskell's own position as a novelist falling short of the first rank. Her sympathies were divided. While pleading for the exploited worker or the woman of lost virtue she still belonged to her own class, giving to the under-dog in pity what might often have been claimed as right. Her realism, as Miss Hopkins points out, may look now like romanticism. In humour she falls short of Jane Austen, in intellectual power of George Eliot, in intensity of the Brontës. But because she is well worth studying as both woman and writer this biography, which could hardly have enraged her family, is a notable piece of portraiture.

SYLVA NORMAN

THE SOUTHERN MARCHES, by H. J. Massingham. *Robert Hale*. 21s.

It is appropriate that over this book there should seem to rest continually a blessing of rainbows—appropriate both to the place described and to Mr. Massingham's inspired description of it. He himself owns that the task of re-exploring this luxurious stretch of the Welsh borderlands was accepted "upon the thoughtless spontaneity of naked love"; and the mood of love permeates every

chapter of this exceptional book. I have read with pleasure and profit most of the author's 40 books, and for me this is one of the best of them.

Mr. Massingham's special triumph as a country writer is that, long before it became (shall I say?) the fashion, he was declaring in the most forthright terms the necessity for an ecological approach. Oneness is all. He was therefore just the man to give us an interpretive study of one of the most abounding regions in the country, being so skilled in the detection of that unifying spirit which informs the local diversity, binding crop and stock, art and craft, architecture and character. The result is that, as we accompany him on his journeys down the valleys of Usk and Wye, borrowing his discerning eye and enjoying the benefit of his wide knowledge, the place lives for us in his pages as in the reality itself.

Untiringly Mr. Massingham has proclaimed the unequivocal need for a return to an economy based on this acceptance of the oneness, the wholeness, of life, and the same message informs his present book. Not that this is a book of nostrums. Rather it is a clear, glowing picture, to the painting of which both heart and mind have brought an equal passion. We see the farms and the work that goes on there, the villages and the life in them, the churches and the dedicated art of them.

Mr. Massingham is sometimes compared with Cobbett, but the comparison is superficial. Admittedly, like Cobbett, he may measure the excellence of a scene by the soundness of its husbandry rather than by any aesthetic standards, as when he rightly admires the Golden Valley primarily for its mixed, non-predatory farming. Like Cobbett, too, he may rage against what he considers abuses of the national well-being, as when he rounds on the Forestry Commission's addiction to conifers—"Are pit-props our only form of wealth?" But, unlike Cobbett, he sees everywhere the cultural life of the spirit without which even the best husbandry would be but the curse of Cain. For his parallels and instances he is

therefore as apt to draw on art as on nature, taking it for granted, as he should, that his readers will be alert to the purport of his references to, say, John Martin's paintings or North's Plutarch or the mystical poems of Henry Vaughan. (Only to music, oddly enough, does he seem a stranger.) And, what sets him even further apart from Cobbett, he is constantly mindful of the religious motives governing life at every turn, so that Tintern Abbey, for instance, is recreated here not so much as a picturesque ruin as a poignant reminder of the Cistercian economy that was once its mainspring.

As the first volume of a new series of regional books, under the same imprint and editorship as the deservedly popular County Books, *The Southern Marches* sets a high standard; indeed, we shall be lucky if future volumes come but up to the shoulder of this one. The map included as an end paper is, I admit, an improvement on those which rather unhelpfully accompanied the County Books, but it could still be bettered. Also, a more personal choice of photographs would surely have been acceptable in a text so charged with the rich personality of its author.

C. HENRY WARREN.

THE ORACLE, by Edwin O'Connor.
Reinhardt & Evans. 10s. 6d.

THE DRINKER, by Hans Fallada.
Putnam. 12s. 6d.

THE MOON AND THE BONFIRE, by Cesare Pavese. *John Lehmann.* 10s. 6d.

Mr. Edwin O'Connor's satirical first novel *The Oracle* starts a shade grotesquely with a plump pundit broadcasting in the nude during a heat-wave to a nation-wide audience of radio-conditioned morons. Thereafter Mr. O'Connor whole-heartedly debunks the peculiarly American institution of the folksy but infallible radio commentator, and his slick, embittered little *tour de force* ranks with Charles Yale Harrison's

Nobody's Fool and John P. Marquand's *So Little Time* among the effective, if often ephemeral, sociological novels that have laid bare the foibles and worse of the New World's way of life. One terms *The Oracle* a *tour de force* because of the devastating effectiveness with which, in its stream-lined style, it scores its points against chosen targets and tells a story at great pace, with unflagging tension, rounding it off with a neat yet satisfying ending. Both pace and stream-lining have their dangers and at times the satire is used more as a bludgeon than a rapier and the commentator becomes little more than a caricatured buffoon while others, such as his wife and father-in-law, although not just 'flat' characters, are sketched in the round with, one may say, too faint a pencil. The commentator's mistress is a stock figure in stock situations and at times the novelist veers between documentary treatment, satire and fantasy. More compassion would let in light to his dark view of his fellow mortals. Or is this cavilling because he has chosen a satiric rather than a humanistic approach? At least, Mr. O'Connor has well written a pungent first novel about people and things he dislikes. One may evaluate his status as a novelist when he essays the harder task of dramatizing virtue in action.

The late Hans Fallada, in his last novel *The Drinker*, plumbs the depths of human misery although one cannot quite claim that he achieves a Dostoevsky-like insight into the lone places of the heart. *The Drinker* traces the process of disintegration of a middle-class German grocer from dipsomania to lunacy and the tale is told, by the grocer, with an excruciating, ironic detachment and the evocation of a stifling, twilight atmosphere of frustration and despair that recalls the novels of Georges Simeon and, in comparable passages, Charles Jackson's *The Lost Weekend*. The author wrote this novel in prison on a murder charge and presumably its prison scenes, if not those in the asylum, are based on first-hand experience. It is sad that this tormented work should be the

last that Fallada gave to the world. It is a bleak yet compelling document but its limitations of scope must be recognized. There is really no spiritual struggle—just complete moral abdication due, we must suppose, not to weakness but to mental instability. Thus the novel inevitably becomes rather a case-history than a tragic drama. The translation by Charlotte and A. L. Lloyd, though one may suspect that it misses some nuances, is expertly unobtrusive.

Cesare Pavese's last novel, admirably translated by Louise Sinclair, is slower-paced, more reflective and more pastoral. *The Moon and the Bonfire* is a chiaroscuro of immediate and recollected impressions by a bastard Italian who has prospered in America and returns after the war to his native village. The theme is that of vain searching for the past, for old companions who are dead or gone or, which is worse, unrecognizably changed, and for lost emotions of youth that have atrophied or been killed by disillusionment. Signor Pavese conveys the significance of the peasant's attachment to the soil—what life means here on earth, with roots or without them—and the Piedmont background is evoked imaginatively, at times poetically, as when mountain villages at night become "nests of stars in the black sky." An elegiac strain runs through the book and there is something Russian in the passivity of its despair; the despair, one feels, of a religious mind without faith, with a hint of sadness from the pagan world. The moon and the bonfire of the title each have somewhat obscure symbolic significance and are also to do with ancient sorceries; what the French call *sorcellèges*. Pavese once translated William Faulkner and has clearly been influenced by him. There are moments in *The Moon and the Bonfire* when we recognize Faulkner's emotionally volcanic, elemental world translated from the Deep South to Italian soil.

LUKE PARSONS

BOOKS ON THE TABLE

The television newsreel showing of Miss Sarah Churchill unveiling a memorial tablet to the American grandmother she so much resembles is a charming footnote to the reading of her father's biography of LORD RANDOLPH CHURCHILL (*Odhams Press*, 21s.), the happy husband of Jenny Jerome. It is nearly 50 years since Mr. Winston Churchill began his "diligent labour" of sorting and assembling 11 large tin boxes of documents which had to be welded into this massive record, now revised and enlarged,* of a short but politically crucial life. The 25-year-old Member for Woodstock's maiden speech "had fire and fluency" said Disraeli "and showed energy of thought and character"; 12 years later, and but seven before his death in 1895, the "Democratic Tory" was announcing his resignation from the offices of Chancellor of the Exchequer and Leader of the House of Commons. Parallels come crowding the mind and speculation is encouraged—not least on what the subsequent career of Lord Randolph might have held had his span been as long as his son's. Certain it is, as Mr. Churchill affirms, that the father's words could be quoted as living contributions to the affairs of to-day. As for the son: half a century away his language had that same felicity this generation takes for granted, and his gift for the quotation that illumines not only the subject but the quality of his own mind was never more plainly demonstrated than in the chapter headings here.

From a Polish childhood

It is hard to realize, so irrepressible is the Prime Minister, that he was writing so well so long ago. Yet it is equally hard to realize that so short a time ago the contemporary *Lord Jim* was written, or *The Nigger of the 'Narcissus'*. Probably the effect of shock is caused by the violence of the pendulum's swing, from respectful laudation to utter and pro-

longed neglect, in the period since. With CONRAD: A Reassessment (*Bowes & Bowes, Cambridge*, 10s. 6d.) Douglas Hewitt comes to the rescue. Nobody would be inclined to doubt that Conrad "did his best work comparatively early," but just how good that best was, is the congenial task of this chronological study to emphasize. The first books and stories being sufficient in themselves, we are reminded that on them must be based any assessment of Conrad's importance and therefore that it is unreasonable to be disappointed "at the marked inferiority" of most of his later output. The man who said: "*Nostromo* is finished; a fact upon which my friends may congratulate me as upon a recovery from a dangerous illness," was not merely a Pole writing in English, surprising or even freakish as such a feat might seem; with that masterpiece "*Tale of the Seaboard*" alone, produced out of the agonies of craftsmanship, he was enriching and ennobling English literature.

"Good Lord, deliver us"

In some quarters the author of MIRACLE AT CARVILLE (*John Lehmann*, 12s. 6d.) has been scolded for not attempting any agonies of craftsmanship in the shaping of her book. This seems an irrelevant criticism, first because she is not and has no desire to be a professional writer and, secondly and supremely, she has endured for herself such special and hellish agonies as no novelist, however accomplished, could adequately imagine or impart. Moreover, for one grateful reader the narrative is entirely redeemed from the commonplace by its burning sincerity. (No critic apparently has cared to exercise his wit regardless of the truth by summing it up as 'all my eye and Betty Martin'.) This is the autobiography of the 19-year-old Betty Martin (though this was not her name, married or single, for in 1927 neither in New Orleans nor anywhere else in the

* with no provision in 12 columns of index for THE FORTNIGHTLY—an exclusion, let it be added, shared by *Hansard*, *Punch* and *The Times*.

world could her real one be so branded) who discovered during the Christmas holidays that she was a leper. It took 20 years to cure her, for in 1947 chaulmoogra oil, which had been used for centuries in the treatment of leprosy (now clinically and mercifully called Hansen's disease), was discarded because the sulphones—promin and diasone—had been discovered, tried and triumphantly proved. Life at Carville, the national leprosarium, is shown to have been sustained by faith—sometimes, as in the author's case, in God, always in the patient research and skill of noble doctors. She learned to make her own bacteriological tests, to help the editor of the hospital paper, to earn money in various ways, and to organize campaigns outside to remove the disease from "the stigmatic, generic, biblical" terminology which precluded the infliction of indignities, such as being deprived of the right to vote. She found love, and for all mankind as well, shed the unthinking selfishness of youth and the last traces of self-pity. Betty Martin now has her wish, expressed in the first verse of her little poem "Yearning" which swept through the United States:

I pray that God reserves for me—
Until the day when I'm set free—
A bit of earth where I may roam;
A place to call my very own.

Blossom time

It is the recurrent need of lesser mortals too, this bit of earth, whether it be for our own garden plot, or for lane and wood and hillside and stream. Just anywhere in the open air *BRITISH FLOWERS IN COLOUR* (Odhams Press. 21s.) would be an acceptable companion. Its 200 and more illustrations may be pored over for their own sake, or for the sterner purpose of identification. B. L. Burtt, the editor, besides writing the Introduction and the chapters "Some Common and Widespread Plants", "Ornamental Trees and Shrubs" and "The Flower Garden", has marshalled a team of enthusiastic experts to discuss in their respective articles such themes as

woodland herbs, meadows and pastures, chalk downs, heath, bog and moor, maritime plants, alpine, and native trees. For "recognition, study and appreciation" the book is factually satisfying without restricting our fanciful flights from the wild lupins of the Orkneys to a mass of phlox in an East London garden.

The open door

A little further east, at Chislehurst in Kent, "a well-kept garden with trim flower beds, smooth lawns and ornamental statuary" was the last retreat of NAPOLEON III IN ENGLAND (*British Technical & General Press*. 18s.). Ivor Guest traces the exile's ups and downs of fortune that led him eventually to the French throne. His sixth journey to England was on a State visit to Queen Victoria. Then came the Franco-German war and he was once more in the wilderness. In 1871 he returned; at Camden Place he lived with his Empress Eugenie and from here two years later he was carried to his burial place in the local church of St. Mary's. His is a twilight world, at least for most English readers, and Mr. Guest's bright and kindly lamp reveals, together with much research on his part, an unexpected interest, sympathy and comprehension on ours, mingled with reawakened pride and hope in England as the traditional host.

Those who would learn more (and like their history unorthodox), should turn to *SECOND EMPIRE MEDLEY* (also *B.T. & G. Press*. 15s.); to this Ivor Guest contributes a chapter "The Heyday of the Cancan". W. H. Holden edits a symposium in which, as a pendant to the last book, Macdonald Critchley's "A Medical History of Napoleon III" caught the immediate eye. The numerous illustrations, disconcertingly (though in a miscellany permissibly) in groups away from their appropriate texts, help to fortify the impression that "monarchy's last fling in France" was a gay, brilliant, extravagant affair, cloaking some solid achievement in art and industry.

GRACE BANYARD